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ARTICLES
“TINKERING” WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION
OF STUDENT SPEECH
ON THE INTERNET
STEVEN M. PUISZIS*
II. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a modern day Pandora’s box. It offers a forum “for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues of intellectual activity.”1 The Internet
provides meaningful learning opportunities for educators and students
unimaginable to earlier generations. However, the Internet also raises a
host of concerns for school administrators and parents over its appropriate use because it can also be “a potent tool for distraction and fomenting
disruption.”2
The Internet has brought to the classroom’s door a fundamental paradox confronting our legal and educational systems. Students using the
Internet must be protected from inappropriate content, cyberbullying or
predatory practices, while the First Amendment protects the rights of
* J.D., 1979, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. Mr. Puiszis is a partner in
the Chicago office of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP. He serves as the Deputy General Counsel of the firm, heads up its Electronic Discovery Response Team, is a member of its Business Litigation Practice Group, and its School Law Group. Mr. Puiszis currently serves on
the Board of Directors of DRI, the Voice of the Defense Bar, chairs DRI’s Judicial Task
Force, is a member of DRI’s Amicus Committee, and is a past President of the Illinois
Association of Defense Counsel. He is also a Fellow in the American Bar Foundation. His
publications include ILLINOIS GOVERNMENTAL TORT AND SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY (3d ed. 2009). Mr. Puiszis was the editor of Without Fear or Favor in 2011: A New
Decade of Challenges to Judicial Independence and Accountability, DRI (2011), available at
http://www.dri.org/News/JudicialTaskForce.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2006).
2. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 222 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring).

167

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-2\SFT201.txt

168

unknown

Seq: 2

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

27-FEB-13

9:35

[Vol. XXIX

those who speak, write, or convey ideas or information over the Web.3
One of the Internet’s unfortunate byproducts is that in today’s digital
era, school administrators are being called upon with increasing frequency to balance the use of Internet-based tools that enrich learning
against the need to maintain order and a safe learning environment.
Balancing these competing concerns is a delicate and complex task.
The task is delicate because the loss of First Amendment rights “even for
minimal periods of time” constitutes irreparable injury.4 The task is
complex because the First Amendment is potentially applicable to any
writings, conduct or symbols so long as an “intent to convey a particular
message” is conveyed, and the “likelihood is great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”5
In its now famous Tinker decision,6 the Supreme Court observed
that students do not shed their First Amendment rights when they enter
the schoolhouse gate.7 Tinker also recognized the need to maintain an
effective learning environment. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a
student’s First Amendment rights are not without limitation, and must
be addressed in light of the “special characteristics of the school environment.”8 Accordingly, the First Amendment rights of students in public
schools “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings.”9 The Court further explained that the nature of students’ rights is determined by gauging “what is appropriate for children
3. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (explaining “our cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet]”);
Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing “that First Amendment
protections for speech extend fully to communications made through the medium of the
internet”).
4. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion).
5. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). See also Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 389
(6th Cir. 2005) (explaining a student’s “desire to wear clothes she ‘feel[s] good in’ as opposed
to her desire to ‘express any particularized message’ ” did not constitute protected speech);
Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 480 F.3d 460, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding a picture imprinted on a student’s t-shirt was “no more expressive of an idea or opinion that the
First Amendment might . . . protect than a young child’s talentless infantile drawing which
[the student’s] design successfully mimics”). While recognizing that clothing might convey
a protected message, the Seventh Circuit in Brandt explained that this particular shirt did
not qualify: “Otherwise every T-shirt that was not all white with no design or words with
not even the manufacturer’s logo or the owner’s name tag, would be protected by the First
Amendment, and the school could not impose dress codes or require uniforms without violating the free speech of students.” Id.
6. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7. Id. at 506.
8. Id. at 506-07. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeter, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988).
9. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
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in school.”10
Nonetheless, school officials are not permitted to prohibit or discipline student speech or expressive activity simply because it may be provocative or controversial, the officials disagree with the student’s point of
view, or the speech is crude or distasteful.11 Indeed, one of the core functions of the First Amendment is to protect controversial speech.12 As the
Supreme Court explained: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or
disagreeable.”13
In a series of decisions addressing students’ First Amendment
rights, the Supreme Court balanced these competing principles, and
broadly outlined when a school can lawfully restrict or discipline a student’s speech or expressive activity that otherwise would be protected by
the First Amendment. However, the Court has not addressed whether a
school may discipline a student for “off-campus speech” or for statements
made or symbols displayed over the Internet from the privacy of the student’s home.14 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court acknowledged that this
has resulted in “some uncertainty as to when courts should apply school
speech precedents.”15 While Morse did not purport to address a school
district’s authority over off-campus speech, the Court in Morse did make
clear that a school district’s authority extends beyond the bricks and
mortar of the school itself and can be exercised in any “school context.”16
10. Morse v. Fredrick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 (2007) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)).
11. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (invalidating the City
of St. Paul’s Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance explaining “[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid,” and that the First Amendment prevents the prohibition of speech
“because of disapproval of the ideas expressed”).
12. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (holding the First Amendment
barred an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim brought by the father of a deceased Marine against an organization for picketing his son’s military funeral); Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (explaining free speech “may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.”).
13. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314 (3d
Cir. 2008) (observing “ ‘harassing’ or discriminatory speech, although evil and offensive,
may be used to communicate ideas or emotions that nevertheless implicate First Amendment protections”); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting “courts have never embraced a categorical ‘harassment exception’ from First
Amendment protection for speech that is within the ambit of federal anti-discrimination
laws”).
14. Doninger v. Neihoff (Doninger I), 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008).
15. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608,
615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004)).
16. Id. at 407-08.
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The Internet has expanded schools’ traditional boundaries and
blurred when, where, and how today’s students enter the schoolhouse
gate. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of Web-based educational
programs offered online to students of all ages.17 In today’s digital era,
with students participating in school activities via on-line learning programs, group web-page postings, instant messaging and other forms of
electronic communication, a two-dimensional view of a school district’s
educational setting and limits of authority ignores modern reality.18 As
one court aptly noted:
For better or for worse, wireless [I]nternet access, smart phones, tablet
computers, social networking sites like Facebook, and stream-of-consciousness communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to speech
that makes any effort to trace First Amendment boundaries along the
physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for serious problems in
our public schools.19

Has the Internet literally (and legally) moved the schoolhouse gate
to a student’s home computer? While school administrators may view
that to be the case, until the Supreme Court resolves the issue, lower
courts and school officials must look for guidance from existing Supreme
Court decisions involving the First Amendment generally, and its decisions specifically addressing student speech. Those decisions, however,
involved fundamentally different forms of media and arose in a markedly
different context.
Several federal circuits have concluded that Tinker can be applied to
off-campus speech, and have applied it to a student’s speech or expressive activities that occurred on the Internet.20 However, that view of
Tinker’s scope of authority is not universally held. A number of lower
courts have concluded that a student’s Internet speech is fully protected
by the First Amendment. As one district court concluded: “The mere fact
that the Internet may be accessed at school does not authorize school
17. 77% of college presidents surveyed in 2011 reported that their schools offer online
courses. Kim Parker, The Digital Revolution and Higher Education, PEW REVIEW RESEARCH CENTER (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/08/28/the-digitalrevolution-and-highereducation/.
18. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48-49. Doninger I reiterated that, “territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limits of [school administrators’] authority.” Id.
at 49 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. of Granville Cent. Sch. Dist, 607 F.2d 1043, 1058
n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (en banc) (acknowledging “Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed solely of bricks and mortar surrounding the schoolyard”).
19. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220-21 (Jordan J., concurring).
20. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48-50; D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
60 (Hannibal), 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d
556, 573-74 (4th Cir. 2011).
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officials to become censors of the World Wide Web.”21
Section II of this article discusses the dynamics of Internet speech
and explains why the Internet provides a unique communication forum
to students. Categories of unprotected speech are discussed in Section
III followed by a survey of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions involving student speech in Section IV. Sections III and IV set the
stage for a discussion of the leading decisions addressing student speech
on the Internet in Sections V and VI. Section V outlines the types of
cases that lower courts have confronted, and Section VI addresses the
circuit split that has arisen involving the First Amendment rights of students for their Internet speech.22 Because it appears unlikely that any
new categories of unprotected speech will be recognized,23 or that new
restrictions on student speech will materialize,24 this article takes the
position in Section VII that the off-campus/on-campus distinction that
has arisen in student First Amendment claims is unworkable for Internet speech. Tinker is broad enough to encompass student speech that
occurs over the Internet.
Typically, decisions involving a Tinker analysis of student speech
merely consider whether the speech resulted in a “substantial and material disruption,” or predictably could result in disruption, and if not, conclude that Tinker is inapplicable.25 However, there is a second prong to
Tinker’s analysis. Tinker applies not only to speech that materially disrupts the classroom or results in substantial disorder, but also to speech
21. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d,
650 F.3d 205, 255 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (addressing a phony MySpace profile of a school
principal created by a student).
22. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 950 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Fisher
J., dissenting) (stating our opinion today causes a split with the Second Circuit).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (invalidating
on First Amendment grounds a state law that prohibited the sale of violent video games to
minors); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585-86 (2010) (refusing to find depictions of animal cruelty as a new category of unprotected speech); United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (overturning on First Amendment grounds, the Stolen Valor
Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006), which made it a crime to falsely claim a person had
received “any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Force of the
United States,” and rejecting the government’s contention that false statements receive no
First Amendment protection). “[P]ersuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is
part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription” is required in order for
the Court to conclude that a new category of speech is categorically unprotected by the
First Amendment. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
24. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). Justices
Alito and Kennedy concluded that the special characteristics of public schools do not necessarily justify any further restrictions on student speech and rejected the suggestion that
school officials can “censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s ‘educational
mission.’” Id.
25. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
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that invades or collides with the “rights of others.”26 Courts have generally ignored this second prong of Tinker, and only a handful of decisions
address student speech that invades the rights of others.27 As a result,
several courts have observed that the precise boundaries of Tinker’s
“rights of other’s” prong is unclear.28 With the advent of student
cyberbullying, Tinker’s second prong merits a fresh look. Section VII of
this article outlines the appropriate boundaries for Tinker’s “rights of
others” prong.
Because the Court’s analysis in Tinker applies to conduct “in class or
out of it,” Tinker is broad enough to encompass Internet speech or activity that results in substantial disruption at the school under its first
prong, or which targets a student or school official for harassment or bullying under Tinker’s second prong. As the Second Circuit’s decisions in
Doninger I and II aptly demonstrate, a student’s Internet speech or activities outside a school can readily cause disruption within it.29 When
disruption within a school occurs, or predictably could occur, school officials should be able to act irrespective of where the speech allegedly took
place without violating the First Amendment.30
Students can collaborate to target another student for harassment
26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (Black, J., dissenting); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512,
516-20 (2d Cir. 1977); Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir.
1986), rev’d on other grounds, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
27. Harper v. Poway United Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Tinker’s “interference with the rights of others” prong to uphold a school district’s authority to prevent a student from wearing a T-shirt that read: “BE ASHAMED, OUR
SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” on the front, and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” written on the back). The Supreme Court in Harper granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari but noted that the district court had entered final judgment
and dismissed the claims for injunctive relief as moot. Harper v. Poway United Sch. Dist.,
549 U.S. 1262 (2007). The Court recalled that it had “previously dismissed interlocutory
appeals from the denials of motions for temporary injunctions once the final judgment has
been entered.” Id. Therefore, the Court held that vacatur of the judgment in Harper was
proper to “ ‘clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and [to]
eliminat[e] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557, 560 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950))) (alterations in original). See also Kowalski,
652 F.3d at 573-74 (upholding a school’s right to discipline under Tinker’s second prong a
student who created a webpage on MySpace.com entitled “S.A.S.H.” or “Students Against
Sluts Herpes,” which singled out another student for bullying, harassment, and intimidation and invited other students to join).
28. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211; DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 314.
29. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48 (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction); Doninger v. Neihoff (Doninger II), 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (awarding qualified immunity to
school officials against plaintiff’s § 1983 damages claim).
30. See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 826-28 (7th Cir. 1998)
(involving an underground paper that included an article providing instructions about how
to hack into the school’s computer system).
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or bullying in school as well as off school grounds.31 While teasing, name
calling or “offensive” speech would not meet Tinker’s rights of others
prong,32 when bullying, or harassing internet speech significantly hampers the targeted student’s educational performance or the student’s
ability to safely interact with other students at school, the First Amendment does not render administrators powerless to intervene. School officials do not have the authority to become censors of the World Wide Web,
but they need to be able to intervene when forces outside the school
threaten to significantly hamper the learning environment within it.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNET SPEECH
The Supreme Court has “recognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems.”33 Accordingly, to understand and meaningfully evaluate the types of First Amendment issues
that have arisen involving student speech on the Internet, it is important
to have a basic understanding of the dynamics of the modern Web.
These dynamics are shaped by the technological and cultural context in
which information is electronically posted on and distributed over the
Web.
Much of today’s Internet teen activity involves the creation and consumption of “social media.” The term social media broadly describes the
various ways that Internet users interact with one another online, and
involves activities such as creating and commenting on blogs,34 uploading and sharing user-generated content including video and photos, and
communicating with friends through social networking sites such as
MySpace or Facebook. Typically, when a new member joins a social
networking site, he or she designs an online profile page, which provides
information about the new member and allows him or her to communicate with other members through e-mail, instant messaging (IM), or elec31. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (involving a video recorded by a group of students off campus in
which they made derogatory and profane statements about a 13-year-old classmate which
they subsequently posted on the Internet on YouTube); Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567-78 (4th
Cir. 2011) (involving the creation of a MySpace.com webpage called “S.A.S.H.” which plaintiff claimed stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes” and was dedicated to ridiculing a
fellow student).
32. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (declaring, “[a]ny word spoken . . . that deviates from the
views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take that risk.”) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 14 (1949).
33. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
34. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 218 n. 19 (stating, “[a] blog (a contraction of the term “web
blog”) is a type of website, usually maintained by an individual with regular entries of
commentary, descriptions of events, or other material such as graphics or video.” (quoting
Wikipedia)).
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tronic bulletin board postings.35 A member’s online profile can be open
to all or access can be limited only to “friends” or “buddies.”
Many courts have been slow to focus on the unique characteristics of
the Internet, which distinguishes it from traditional modes of communication. Several traditional forms of communication, such as the print
and broadcast media, are heavily regulated and expensive to use.36 One
of the attractive features of the Internet is that it permits free and unfettered discussion of issues, with practically no regulation or oversight.37
Many individuals lack the resources to use print or broadcast media.
The Internet on the other hand, is both easy and inexpensive to use.38
YouTube, an Internet video website, nearly has eliminated “the cost of
mass media distribution,” and as a result, “offers its users unparalleled
opportunities for free expression.”39
Historically, the flow of information with traditional forms of print
and broadcast media was one dimensional, flowing from the speaker or
writer to the listener or the reader. The Internet encourages the multidimensional flow of digital information between participants. Multiple
forms of information, such as photos, video, music and messages can be
readily transferred simultaneously on the Internet.
The spoken or printed word is capable of reaching a finite audience.
Information posted on the Internet can reach a far larger audience potentially anywhere in the world. Moreover, social networking sites and
web-based interactive services encourage the development of affinity
groups sharing common interests. As a result, messages can be easily
conveyed to persons sharing the same interests or points of view.40 Ano35. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (explaining
online “profiles” are “individual web pages on which members post photographs, videos and
information about their lives and interests,” and that once a profile has been created the
new member “can extend ‘friend invitations’ to other members and communicate with her
friends . . . via e-mail, instant messages or blogs”).
36. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (explaining that “of all the
forms of communication,” broadcasting is the most heavily regulated and has received the
least protection under the First Amendment).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (2006) (noting that the Internet has flourished “with a minimum of governmental regulation”); Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (noting “YouTube doesn’t actively monitor the content of the postings on its
website”).
38. Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 (declaring “[a]ny person or organization with a computer
connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information”).
39. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. The district court in Geller further noted that
anyone with Internet access can sign up for a YouTube account and upload a video file to
its servers, which allows the video to “be accessed and viewed anywhere in the world, all for
free.” Id.
40. Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d at 846. “The idea of online social networking
is that members use their online profiles to become part of an online community of people
with common interests.” Id.
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nymity is another feature of the Internet which makes it a preferred
mode of communication for many who otherwise may be unwilling to express their views on controversial subject matters.
While T.V. and radio removes the spatial distance between the
speaker and the listener, there are geographic limits to the reach of that
media. The Internet similarly eliminates the distance between the person posting and viewing content on the Web, with one significant difference. The Internet has no geographic or territorial limits. Today any
student with a computer can post information on the Internet that can
be accessed anywhere in the world, almost instantaneously.41 There are
no boundaries or limits to the flow of information on the Internet.42
These features make the Internet a highly popular and effective
means of communicating ideas and information. However, these same
features also make negative comments far more damaging and anonymous messages or threats far more menacing when made over the
Internet.
Internet and social media usage has virtually exploded over the past
decade. Last year, the Internet had 239,893,600 users in the United
States or 77.3% of all persons living in America.43 In 2009, ninety three
percent (93%) of American teens used the Internet. Seventy three percent (73%) of those teens used the Internet to access online social
networking sites, sixty two percent (62%) used the Internet to obtain
news or information about current events, forty eight percent (48%) used
the Internet to make an on-line purchase and thirty eight percent (38%)
shared something which they created on-line.44 Facebook claims to have
more than 800 million active users.45 If Facebook were a country it
would be the third largest nation in the world.46
41. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring) (commenting on the “everywhere at
once” nature of the Internet).
42. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996). “Global computer based communications cut across
territorial borders, creating a new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility
– and legitimacy – of laws based on geographic boundaries.” Id. Reno, 521 U.S. at 853-54
(noting when a provider posts information on its website, it is available “wherever Internet
users live”).
43. United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET
WORLD STATS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm.
44. Trend Data for Teens, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (May 2011), http://
pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-for-Teens/Online-Activities-Total.aspx.
45. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=
22.
46. Socialnomics, Social Media Statistics 2011: Amazing Facts About Internet Use
(VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/08/social-media-statistics-2011_n_873116.html.
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Before discussing decisions that have addressed the interplay of the
First Amendment and student speech on the Internet, the following section of this article briefly reviews the Supreme Court’s decisions involving categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment.
The article then turns to the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing student speech. This discussion will bring into focus the guideposts that
school officials have to navigate when addressing students’ use of the
Internet and social media.
III. CATEGORIES OF SPEECH NOT PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment’s protection does not extend to certain welldefined and narrowly limited categories of speech that can be regulated
because of their “constitutionally proscribable content.”47 These exceptions are based on the notion that certain categories of speech have so
little social value that any benefit they could produce clearly would be
outweighed “by the social interest in order and morality.”48 When a student’s speech or expressive activity fits within one of the categories outlined below, the First Amendment generally offers no protection.49 As a
result, speech or expressive activity can be prohibited and a student can
be disciplined without running afoul of the First Amendment, irrespective of whether the speech occurs within the school setting or outside the
schoolhouse gate.
However, the Supreme Court also has explained that merely because the following categories of speech may be proscribed does not make
them “invisible to the Constitution,” or provide a basis to discriminate
based on the identity of the speaker, the topic, or the viewpoint expressed.50 Attempts to regulate speech based on its content still are presumptively invalid, even for categories of unprotected speech.51 As the
Court explained, while a government can proscribe obscenity, “it could
not prohibit only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the
government.”52
47. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
48. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 565, 572 (1942).
49. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 764-65 (applying the “true threats” exception to a student’s
off-campus instant messages to another student about obtaining a gun and shooting other
students).
50. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
51. Id. at 383-84.
52. Id. at 391-92 (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited the display of a “symbol”
that a person knew of or had reason to know would arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender” because the ordinance imposed
special prohibitions on speakers who expressed views on certain disfavored topics while
permitting displays “containing abusive invective” so long as they were not directed at
those topics).
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A. TRUE THREATS
In Watts v. United States, the petitioner participated in a public
rally against police brutality. In a discussion group, he complained
about his draft classification and having to report for a military physical
and stated: “If they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to
get in my sights is L.B.J.” The Supreme Court in Watts held that while
threats of violence are not protected speech, the petitioner’s statement
was “political hyperbole” and not a “true threat.” Therefore, his statement fell under the penumbra of the First Amendment, and he could not
be prosecuted for threatening the President.53
True threats “encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”54
Whether a student “intended to communicate a potential threat is a
threshold issue, and a finding of no intent to communicate obviates the
need to assess whether the speech constitutes a ‘true threat.’ ”55
An objective approach is taken when evaluating whether the alleged
threat should be treated “as a serious expression of an intent to cause a
present or future harm.”56 However, a split in the circuits has developed
as to which viewpoint the statement should be interpreted, the speaker
or the recipient; in other words, “what a person making the statement
should have reasonably foreseen or what a reasonable person receiving
the statement would believe.”57
The Seventh Circuit evaluates “not what the [speaker] intended but
whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the [speaker’s]
statement as a threat.”58 The Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits simi53. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam).
54. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). See also Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 764-65
(applying the “true threat” test to instant messages from one student at home to another
student in which he discussed getting a gun and shooting other students at school).
55. Porter, 393 F.3d at 617.
56. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
See also Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding a student’s essay
that “expressed in graphic terms a plan to kill [his teacher] and himself” constituted a true
threat); Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding a
student’s diary describing his orders to a pseudo-Nazi group harming homosexuals and
colored people and then committing a “Columbine shooting” attack at his high school was
not protected speech given its “violent and disturbing content”); Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984-85 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding a student’s story written in a notebook
about a dream of shooting her math teacher was “reasonably construed as a threat of physical violence and was not protected by the First Amendment).
57. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490 (1st Cir. 1997).
58. United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990); Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d at 622.
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larly evaluate the statement from the viewpoint of the recipient.59 The
First, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits evaluate the statement from the
viewpoint of the speaker.60
The Eighth Circuit has recognized that debate over the proper viewpoint from which to evaluate a purported threat is “largely academic because in the vast majority of cases the outcome will be the same under
both tests.”61 The outcome will differ only in rare instances “when the
recipient suffers from some unique sensitivity,” and that sensitivity is
unknown to the speaker.62
Factors that courts have used in evaluating whether a statement
constitutes a true threat include: a) whether the statement was conditional; b) whether the statement was communicated directly to the alleged target; c) whether the person making the statement had a history
of making threats to the person who was targeted by the statement; and
d) if there was any reason to believe the maker of the statement had a
propensity toward violence.63
B. FIGHTING WORDS
Fighting words originally were defined as “those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace.”64
In Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, a Jehovah’s Witness called a governmental official “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist.” The
Supreme Court concluded that those statements qualified as “fighting
words,” and therefore, were not protected under the First Amendment.65
The “fighting words” exception was limited by the Court’s subsequent decision in Cohen v. California,66 where the defendant was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket in a courthouse
bearing the words “Fuck the Draft.” The Court concluded that the State
could not make “the simple public display . . . of this single four-letter
expletive a criminal offense.”67 The Court explained that “[w]hile the
four letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it
59. United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Marsonet,
484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973); Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d at 622.
60. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491; United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir.
1992); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 629 (10th Cir. 1984).
61. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d at 623.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
65. Id. at 573.
66. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
67. Id. at 26.
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was not ‘directed to the person of the hearer.’ ” In the Court’s view, “[n]o
individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on [Cohen’s] jacket as a direct personal insult.”68 However, as explained below in “Subsection IV B”, a school could bar a
student from wearing Cohen’s jacket in school.
The Seventh Circuit explained that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed Chaplinsky’s original definition of fighting words so
that the exception is limited to only those words or phrases that tend to
provoke an immediate breach of the peace.69 Accordingly, speech that
merely offends, rouses anger, or causes emotional harm or psychic
trauma does not constitute fighting words and is protected by the First
Amendment.70 To qualify as fighting words the speech must be of a personally insulting nature and be directed at a particular person or
group.71 However “an actual disturbance is not required for the doctrine
to apply.”72
In Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that a t-shirt worn by a high school student bearing
the phrase, “Be Happy, Not Gay” did not constitute fighting words. The
court viewed the phrase as “only tepidly negative.”73 Judge Posner in
68. Id. at 20 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 309 (1940)).
69. Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at
409 (confining fighting words to those “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation,
and thereby causing a breach of the peace”); NAACP v. Claiborne Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927
(1982) (explaining fighting words as “those that provoke immediate violence”); Terminiello,
337 U.S. at 4 (holding speech is protected “unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest . . . [t]here is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view”).
70. Purtell, 527 F.3d at 624-25 (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)
(involving a proposed march by the National Socialist Party of America wearing Nazi
uniforms and carrying Nazi flags with swastikas through Skokie, Illinois which “had a
large Jewish population and was home to many Holocaust survivors”).
71. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973).
72. Purtell, 527 F.3d at 625 (holding plaintiff calling his father-in-law a “fat son-of-abitch,” a coward by clucking like a chicken, and repeatedly telling him “fuck you” constituted fighting words (citing Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 2004))).
73. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 876-77 (7th Cir. 2011).
In Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, the Court directed that a preliminary injunction be entered that would permit students to wear a “Be Happy Not Gay” t-shirt during
school hours. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit in Zamecnik held a school
that “permits advocacy of the rights of homosexual students cannot be allowed to stifle
criticism of homosexuality.” 636 F.3d at 876. However, Harper upheld a school district’s
authority to prevent a student from attending school wearing a t-shirt that read: “BE
ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” on the front,
and: “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” on the back. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
Unlike Zamecnik, the year before the school district in Harper had experienced an altercation resulting in the suspension of students who wore t-shirts displaying derogatory remarks about homosexuals during a “Straight-Pride Day.” Id. at 1171-73. However, Harper
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Zamecnik, wistfully discussed “an expansive interpretation of the ‘fighting words’ doctrine when the speech in question is that of students,”74
because it would enhance the ability of school officials to address challenging speech.
Various courts have recognized that grammar and high school students, by reason of their lack of maturity, are more likely to impulsively
respond to statements or threats that an adult would ignore.75 The Supreme Court also has explained “a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience.”76 Whether a
specific communication is protected by the First Amendment “always requires some consideration of both its content and its context.”77 So,
there is no reason why the age of the recipient78 cannot be considered
when evaluating whether a student’s speech constituted fighting
words.79
C. SPEECH THAT INCITES IMMINENT LAWLESS ACTION
Brandenburg v. Ohio involved a criminal conviction for certain racist
and anti-Semitic remarks made at a Ku Klux Klan rally calling for
“revengeance.” In overturning that conviction, the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment protects the advocacy of illegal or unlawful
action unless it “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”80
did not base its decision on Tinker’s substantial disruption test. Its holding was based on
Tinker’s “invading the rights of others” prong. Id. at 1177.
74. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 876.
75. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating
“scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to confirm [a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults. . . . These
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions. . . . Adolescents
are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior . . . [and]
juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure.” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)) (quotation
marks omitted).
76. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272.
77. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982). Justice Holmes also observed, “[a]
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418. 425 (1918).
78. Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1994) (holding “it is proper to
consider the age of the addressee” when determining if certain statements qualified as
fighting words).
79. See, e.g., DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315. “Certain speech, however, which cannot be prohibited to adults may be prohibited to public elementary and high school students.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
80. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam).
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D. OBSCENITY
Obscenity has long been held to fall outside the purview of the First
Amendment. For years the Supreme Court struggled to define obscenity
in a way that did not impermissibly burden protected speech. In Miller
v. California,81 the Court settled on a three-part test for determining
whether material is obscene and thus unprotected:
(a) whether ‘the average person applying contemporary community
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;82 and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.83

The Supreme Court has rejected attempts to expand the obscenity
exception to include violent speech,84 or to “whatever a legislature finds
shocking.”85 It only applies to depictions of “sexual conduct.”
E. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A related and overlapping category of proscribable speech is child
pornography, which involves “sexually explicit visual portrayals of children.”86 The Supreme Court affords less protection to child pornography
than it does to obscenity because the test for obscenity does not involve
the compelling interest of preventing the sexual exploitation of children.87 Accordingly, statutes that prohibit any child pornography, even
when the material does not meet the test for obscenity, and statutes that
criminalize the possession of child pornography, even in situations when
an adult’s possession of obscene material could not be criminalized, have
81. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
82. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2011 WL 3501698, at *7-8
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011) (holding photos of 15 and 16-year-old high school girls posing with
phallic-shaped rainbow colored lollipops and toy tridents, which they posted on their MySpace and Facebook pages did not meet the test for obscene speech under state law, and
therefore, the students were immune from school discipline under the First Amendment
because the photos did not result in substantial disruption at their school).
83. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
84. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514-19 (1948) (invalidating a New York statute
that forbade “collections of stories ‘so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and
depraved crimes against the person’ ”). In Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2734, the Court explained
that Winters “made clear that violence is not part of obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.”
85. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
86. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103
(1990); New York v. Ferber, 158 U.S. 747 (1982). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006) (defining child pornography as a “visual depiction involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct”).
87. Ferber, 158 U.S. at 761.
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withstood First Amendment challenges.88
Child pornography can involve “actual or simulated” sexual acts, but
to constitute simulated child pornography, the conduct depicted must
create a “realistic impression of an actual sexual act.”89 As a result,
photos that fifteen and sixteen year old high school students posted on
their MySpace and Facebook pages posing with rainbow colored phallicshaped lollipops and toy tridents did not constitute child pornography
and were protected by the First Amendment.90
F. OFFERS

TO

ENGAGE

IN

ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded
from First Amendment protection.”91 This exception is based upon the
rationale that these types of offers, “have no sound value, and thus, like
obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection.”92 A distinction has
been recognized between the “abstract advocacy of illegality” addressed
in Brandenburg and proposals to engage in illegal activity upon which
criminal laws like solicitation, pandering and conspiracy are based.93
G. FRAUD

AND

PERJURY

Two other categories of unprotected speech involve fraudulent statements94 and perjury.95 The Supreme Court long ago recognized “[t]he
First Amendment does not shield fraud.”96 The power of government to
protect its citizens from fraud has “always been recognized in this country and is firmly established.”97 This includes fraudulent appeals “made
in the name of charity and religion.”98 Perjury statutes have consistently withstood constitutional challenge because they are necessary to
88. Williams, 553 U.S. at 288.
89. Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074, 1080 (4th Cir. 2006).
90. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2011 WL 3501698, at *7-8.
91. Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm’n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)); Gibboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
92. Williams, 553 U.S. at 297.
93. Id. at 298-99.
94. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003).
95. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978) (noting the “unquestioned constitutionality of perjury statutes”).
96. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. at 612 (citing Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.,
333 U.S. 178 (1948)).
97. Donaldson, 333 U.S. at 190.
98. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. at 612 (citing Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)).
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preserve the integrity of our legal system.99
Both fraud and perjury require a false statement to be actionable,
which suggests that false statements should enjoy no First Amendment
protection. Indeed, the Supreme Court in a number of decisions suggested that to be the case.100 However, in United States v. Alvarez,101
which invalidated on First Amendment grounds the Stolen Valor Act,102
the Supreme Court rejected the government’s contention that false statements are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.103
A plurality of the Court in Alvarez rejected the government’s contention “that false statements, as a general rule, are beyond constitutional
protection,”104 explaining that statements appearing in some of the
Court’s prior decisions about the lack of First Amendment protection for
“false statements” arose in “cases discussing defamation, fraud, or some
other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, such as
an invasion of privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation.”105 The plurality in Alvarez further noted that even with defamation and fraud, “falsity
alone” will not take speech outside the protection of the First Amend99. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (explaining perjury statutes are
necessary “[t]o uphold the integrity of our trial system,” and therefore, “the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned”).
100. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the truth seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas”); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake”); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171
(1979) (“Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the
truth do not enjoy constitutional protection”); BE & K Constr. Co v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516,
531 (2002) (“[F]alse statements may be unprotected for their own sake”); Bill Johnson’s
Rest., Inc., v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“[F]alse statements are not immunized by
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech”); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60
(1982) (“Of course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in
the same manner as truthful statements”).
101. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (making it a crime to falsely claim a person had been awarded
“any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United
States”).
103. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (observing “[t]he Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment
protection”).
104. Id. at 2544-45 (explaining “isolated statements in some [of the Court’s] earlier decisions do not support the Government’s submission that false statements, as a general rule,
are beyond constitutional protection”).
105. Id. at 2545.
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ment; rather, “a knowing or reckless falsehood,”106 is required, a point
on which the dissenting Justices in Alvarez agreed.107
Additionally, five Justices in Alvarez—the three who dissented,108
and the two who concurred in the judgment109—agreed “there are broad
areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize purportedly false
speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing
truthful speech. Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, social sciences, the arts and other matters of public concern would present such a threat.”110 Thus, false statements do enjoy a
measure of constitutional protection. One factor animating the Supreme
Court’s decision in Alvarez was the recognition “that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be open and vigorous expression of
views in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.”111
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS INVOLVING
STUDENT SPEECH
Assuming that a student’s speech or expressive activity falls outside
of one of the above categories of unprotected speech, school officials still
106. Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (prohibiting a
public official from obtaining a damages recovery for defamation unless a statement was
made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not”)); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 73 (explaining “[e]ven when the utterance is false, the great
principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression . . . preclude attaching
adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood”); Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. at 620 (“False statement alone does not subject a fundraiser to fraud
liability”).
107. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2563 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Thus, in order to prevent the
chilling of truthful speech on matters of public concern, we have held that liability for the
defamation of a public official or figure requires proof that defamatory statements were
made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity. . . . This same requirement
applies when public officials and figures seek to recover for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. . . . And we have imposed ‘[e]xacting proof requirements’ in other
contexts as well when necessary to ensure that truthful speech is not chilled”) (citations
omitted).
108. Id. at 2256. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion
in Alvarez. Id.
109. Id. at 2551. Justices Breyer and Kagan agreed that the Stolen Valor Act violated
the First Amendment, but chose not to base their “conclusion on a strict categorical analysis.” Instead they applied “intermediate scrutiny,” or “proportionality review,” which examines “the fit between statutory ends and means” in order “to determine whether the statute
works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justification.” Under that approach they found the Act violated the First Amendment concluding “the Government
could achieve its legitimate objectives through less restrictive ways.” Id.
110. Id. at 2564 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 2544 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (“Th[e] erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate”)).
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may prohibit that speech or subject the student to discipline without violating the First Amendment under the following circumstances:
A. SPEECH THAT SUBSTANTIALLY DISRUPTS THE
SCHOOL OR INVADES THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
students who wore black armbands to protest of the Vietnam War were
suspended until they returned to school without them.112 The students’
protest was described by the Court as “a silent, passive expression of
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.”113 The students claimed the school district’s discipline violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court concluded that the students engaged in
“political speech” by wearing the armbands for the purpose of expressing
their view about the war.
The Supreme Court in Tinker held that school officials may discipline students when their speech or expressive activity results in “material and substantial interference with school work or discipline” or when
it interferes with the rights of others.114 The Court explained that if
there were “facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
authorities, then disciplinary measures can be imposed.”115
The Court in Tinker observed that no material disruption had occurred at the school, and noted the school district had failed to present
any facts that might have reasonably led school officials to predict that a
disruption of school activities was likely to occur. Thus, Tinker held that
the imposition of student discipline under those circumstances violated
112. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
113. Id. at 508. Three years before Tinker was decided, the Fifth Circuit simultaneously
announced two decisions addressing a student’s right to wear a “freedom button” at school.
Burnside v. Byars upheld a student’s right to wear a button inscribed with the phrase “One
Man One Vote,” but also recognized that school disciplinary regulations are “essential in
maintaining order and discipline on school property” and those that “measurably contribute to the maintenance of order and decorum within the educational system” are reasonable. 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1996). Because wearing the buttons did not result in any
disturbance in Burnside, the school’s regulation forbidding the buttons violated the students’ First Amendment rights. However, in Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
the school board provided evidence which showed that students who wore the freedom buttons “conducted themselves in a disorderly manner, disrespected classroom procedure, interfered with the proper decorum and discipline of the school and disturbed other students
who did not wish to participate in the wearing of the buttons.” 363 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir.
1966). Under the circumstances, the court in Blackwell held the school district could ban
the buttons on school property without violating the First Amendment. The distinguishing
factor between Burnside and Blackwell was the evidence of disruption caused by the students’ conduct. These decisions heavily influenced the Court’s holding in Tinker.
114. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
115. Id. at 514.
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the students’ First Amendment rights.116
Tinker did not require that a student’s speech involve a matter of
public concern before the protection of the First Amendment can be invoked. In Lowry v. Watson Chapel School District, the Eighth Circuit
addressed a student protest of a school dress code.117 The students in
Lowry, just as in Tinker, wore black armbands in silent protest of the
school policy and, just as in Tinker, the wearing of the arm bands did not
result in any disruption at their school.118 The court in Lowry held it
was constitutionally immaterial whether students “protest national foreign policy or local school board policy.”119 Lowry held the discipline violated the students’ First Amendment rights.
Tinker explained that its “substantial disruption” analysis should be
applied to student conduct that occurs “in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or [invades] the
rights of others.”120 However, a student’s First Amendment rights cannot be restricted under Tinker merely because school administrators
wish to avoid a controversy nor may school officials base a restriction on
an unsubstantiated fear of disruption.121 “While there must be more
than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech, complete
chaos is not required” to meet Tinker’s substantial disruption test.122
Where a school district has experienced threats, confrontations or altercations between students in the past, courts generally have upheld a district’s forecast of disruption under Tinker.123
116. Id. See also Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 330 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding a
student’s discipline for wearing a t-shirt critical of George W. Bush violated the First
Amendment where the record reflected the student had worn the shirt many times and it
had never caused any disruption); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.3d 524, 530
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding a school district that punished students for wearing “SCAB” buttons during a teacher’s strike to protect the use of replacement teachers violated the First
Amendment because it failed to prove the buttons were “inherently disruptive”).
117. Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008).
118. Id. at 758.
119. Id. at 759-60.
120. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
121. Id. at 509.
122. J.S. v Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted
and collecting cases). See also Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 822 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011) (holding substantial disruption was established by evidence establishing that the
University contacted police to investigate a mortuary science student’s Facebook postings
referencing a “Death List” and wanting to stab someone, and had to respond to the concerns of the program’s donors over the student’s conduct and the professionalism of the
University’s program).
123. See, e.g., DeFabio v. East Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir.
2010) (holding a student’s mere presence in the school would likely result in a material and
substantial disruption in light of threats to kill him and bomb his home); West v. Derby
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding a student’s
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So long as school officials “have reason to believe” that a student’s
expression will be disruptive, Tinker’s standard is met.124 Tinker does
not require that school officials wait until some actual disruption occurs
before they can act.125 However, school officials must be ready to present proof of the relevant facts on which their forecast of disruption was
based.126 For example, Boucher v. School Board of Greenfield involved a
student’s article, which explained how to “hack” into the school computers. The school district presented testimony from computer experts it
had retained to perform diagnostic testing on the school’s computers following publication of the article. The experts’ diagnostic testing revealed
signs of tampering, and the school district changed all of the passwords
mentioned in the article. While the tampering which the experts found
could not be tied directly to the article, the Seventh Circuit held the evidence was sufficient to meet Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.
Words or phrases are not considered offensive and cannot be banned
under Tinker simply because they are synonymous with provocative or
offensive terms or symbols. In one notable decision, the Third Circuit
held a school district violated a student’s First Amendment rights by
banning a Jeff Foxworthy t-shirt listing the top 10 reasons a person
might be a “redneck sports fan,” even though the district could ban dissuspension for drawing a confederate flag in class because the school district had experienced a series of prior incidents related to displays of the confederate flag). Other circuits
have upheld a school district’s right to ban displays of the confederate flag on student’s
clothing in light of prior racial violence, threats and tensions. See Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d
554 (6th Cir. 2008); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009); A.M.
ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009); Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d
324 (6th Cir. 2010). Scott v. School Bd. of Alachua Cnty. upheld a ban of the Confederate
symbols on school grounds not only under Tinker’s substantial disruption test but also as
vulgar and offensive speech under Fraser. Scott, 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam). The Sixth Circuit declined to follow that approach, and concluded that displays of
Confederate flags may only be regulated by satisfying the Tinker standard. See Barr, 538
F.3d at 569 n.7; Spiva, 625 F.3d at 325 n.6.
124. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827-28 (rejecting the argument that school officials must
show “actual harm” before they can act); Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 673 (rejecting the contention
that a school must prove that “serious consequences in fact will ensue” and holding “[i]t is
enough for the school to present ‘facts which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption’ ”) (emphasis in original).
125. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 673; see also Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 51 (declaring “[t]he question is not whether there has been actual disruption, but whether school officials ‘might
reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue” (citing LaVine v.
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001))); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584,
591-92 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating, “Tinker does not require school officials to wait until the
horse has left the barn before closing the door . . . [i]t does not require certainty, only that
the forecast of substantial disruption be reasonable”).
126. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827-28 (overturning a preliminary injunction and upholding a
high school student’s expulsion for writing an article in an underground school newspaper
published off campus explaining how to hack into the school’s computers).
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plays of the Confederate flag under Tinker.127 The court noted there was
no reason to believe the terms “redneck” and “hick” that appeared on the
shirt might cause a disturbance.128 The court explained:
Where a school seeks to suppress a term merely related to an expression that has proven to be disruptive, it must do more than simply point
to a general association. It must point to a particular and concrete basis
for concluding that the association is strong enough to give rise to [a]
well-founded fear of genuine disruption in the form of substantially interfering with school operations or with the rights of others. . . Most
commonly the prior speech will have carried an offensive or provocative
meaning and the similar speech will have a similar meaning.129

The court ultimately concluded the term “redneck” was not sufficiently
related to words and symbols that were associated with prior racial hostilities at the school and there was no reason to believe the shirt would
disrupt school functions.
1. The Influence of Justice Black’s Dissent in Tinker
Justice Hugo Black wrote a powerful dissent in Tinker, the echoes of
which can be heard in the Court’s subsequent First Amendment decisions addressing student speech.130 In his view, the mission of public
schools is “to give students the opportunity to learn,” and given their age,
children “need to learn, not teach.”131 Despite the absence of “obscene
remarks” or “loud disorder,” he concluded the wearing of the black armbands “did exactly what the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took their minds off their class work and
diverted their thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war.”132
Justice Black was highly critical of the Court “arrogat[ing] to itself,
rather than to the State’s elected officials charged with running the
schools, the decision as to which disciplinary regulations are ‘reasonable.’”133 He explained that school discipline “is an integral and important part of training our children to be good citizens” and concluded that
Tinker undermined the ability of school officials to impart that
127. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254-59 (3d Cir. 2002).
128. Id. at 257.
129. Id.
130. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271 n.4 (observing “the Fraser Court cites as ‘especially
relevant’ a portion of Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Tinker ‘disclaim[ing] any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution compels teachers, parents and elected school
official to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students,’” and then noting “[o]f course Justice Black’s observations are equally relevant to the
instant case”).
131. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 523 (Black, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-2\SFT201.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 23

TINKERING WITH FIRST AMENDMENT

27-FEB-13

9:35

189

training.134
2. Does Tinker Apply to Elementary Schools?
In Morgan v. Swanson, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether qualified immunity should be awarded to several grammar school principals
for their actions in restricting their students’ distribution of written
materials to classmates while in school.135 Morgan granted qualified immunity to those school officials in part “because Tinker’s applicability in
elementary schools has never been clearly established.”136
The Court in Morgan explained that “[n]either the Supreme Court
nor this Court has expressly extended Tinker-based speech rights into
the elementary-school setting,” and further observed that both the Third
and Seventh Circuits have expressed doubts “whether and to what extent” Tinker’s protection applies to student speech in public elementary
schools.137
The Third Circuit has observed: “[t]here can be little doubt that
speech appropriate for eighteen-year-old high school students is not necessarily acceptable for seven-year-old grammar school students.”138 Accordingly, the younger the student the more control a school official can
exercise over student speech.139 And on this age continuum, “at a certain
point, a school child is so young that it might reasonably be presumed
the First Amendment does not protect the kind of speech at issue
here.”140
134. Id. at 524 Justice Black concluded that Tinker “subjects all public schools in the
country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest
students.” Id. at 525.
135. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo
Cnty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 1995) (awarding qualified immunity to school
officials who prohibited an elementary school student from wearing t-shirts saying “Unfair
Grades,” “Racism,” and “I Hate Lost Creek” (the grammar school in question) explaining
“given the indications in Fraser and Kuhlmeier that age is a relevant factor in accessing the
extent of a student’s free speech rights in school in addition to the dearth of case law in the
lower federal courts, we are unable to conclude that the . . . right [defendant] is alleged to
have violated was ‘clearly established’ ”) (emphasis in original).
136. Morgan, 659 F.3d at 384.
137. Id. at 377 n.72.
138. Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2003). See also S.G. v.
Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding “a school’s authority to
control student speech in an elementary setting is undoubtedly greater than in a high
school setting”).
139. Waltz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining “the age of the students bears an important inverse relationship to the degree and kind
of control a school may exercise”); Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 876 (holding “the younger the
children, the more latitude school authorities have in limiting expression”).
140. Walker-Serrano, 325 F.3d at 417; see also Brandt, 480 F.3d at 466 (declaring “we
have our doubts whether the constitutional privilege to engage in protest demonstrations
in the name of free speech extends to eighth graders”).
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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser involved a speech made at a
high school assembly by a student who nominated a fellow classmate for
elective office.141 The student’s nominating speech was riddled with sexual innuendos describing the fellow classmate as “firm in his pants,” a
“man who takes his point and pounds it in,” and would “go to the very
end—even the climax.”142 While the speech did not meet the test for
obscenity,143 the “pervasive sexual innuendo” of the speech “was plainly
offensive to both teachers and students.”144 Fraser rejected the student’s
argument that his suspension violated the First Amendment and held
that student speech, which is vulgar, lewd or plainly offensive, is not protected by the First Amendment.145
Fraser recognized that a school need not tolerate speech or expressive activity that would undermine its “basic educational mission,”146
and since one of the purposes of public education is to “prepare pupils for
citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility.”147 The Court explained these fundamental values “must
also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others,” and
the “freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools
and classrooms must be balanced against society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”148 The Fraser Court concluded that vulgarity is “wholly
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education,”149
and that “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”150
The Court observed, “the First Amendment gives a high school student
the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”151
The Court subsequently explained the type of “plainly offensive”
speech prohibited by Fraser does not encompass speech that might fit
under “some definition of ‘offensive’ . . . since much political and religious
141. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675.
142. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 683.
145. Id. at 685.
146. Id.
147. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 685-86.
150. Id. at 683.
151. Id. at 682 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1057 (Newman, J., concurring)). Judge
Newman also observed in Thomas: “Courts have a First Amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar.” Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1057 (Newman, J., concurring).
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speech might be perceived as offensive to some.”152 The Second Circuit
highlighted this point when it observed that lower courts treat Fraser’s
plainly offensive speech “synonymously with and as part and parcel of
speech that is lewd, vulgar and indecent-meaning speech that is something less than obscene but related to that concept, that is to say, speech
containing sexual innuendo and profanity.”153 Accordingly, buttons
bearing the word “scab” that students wore during a teacher’s strike,154
and buttons with a picture of Hitler Youth that students wore to protest
a dress code policy have been held not to constitute vulgar or plainly
offensive speech under Fraser.155
However, school districts’ attempts to ban students from wearing
breast cancer awareness bracelets bearing the slogan “I [heart] Boobies!
(Keep A Breast)” have yielded conflicting results in the district courts.
One district court rejected the argument that the phrase “I [heart] Boobies! (Keep A Breast)”could be interpreted as a double entendre, concluding that the message on the bracelet was not “vulgar” speech because it
had no inherent sexual connotation and arose in the context of a national
breast cancer awareness campaign.156 Another district court disagreed
with that conclusion, noting the bracelets employ “hints of vulgarity and
sexuality to attract attention and provoke a conversation, a ploy that is
effective for its target audience of immature middle school students.”157
While recognizing the bracelets promote a worthy social cause, the court
also concluded it was “reasonable” for school officials in a middle-school
context to conclude the phrase “was vulgar and inconsistent with their
goal of fostering respectful discourse.”158
Fraser addressed student speech that took place on school property
at a school assembly, and did not involve off-campus speech. Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Fraser observed: “If [the] respon152. Morse, 551 U.S. at 409; Guiles, 461 F.3d at 328 (stating, “[w]hat is plainly offensive
for purposes of Fraser must therefore be narrower than the dictionary definition”).
153. Guiles, 461 F.3d at 328; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (finding Fraser permits a school to
prohibit words that “offend for the same reason that obscenity offends”).
154. Chandler, 978 F.3d at 530 (observing in the context of a motion to dismiss that the
word ‘scab’ is not “considered per se vulgar, evil, obscene or plainly offensive”).
155. DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 (D.N.J. 2007) (noting
that the image on the buttons could be interpreted as insulting or thought to be in poor
taste but was not lewd, vulgar or plainly offensive as required by Fraser).
156. H. v. Eastern Area Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 1376141, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. April 12,
2011).
157. K.J. ex rel. Braun v. Sauk Prairie Sch. Dist., No 11-cv-622-bcc, slip op. at 15 (W.D.
Wisc. Feb 6, 2012).
158. Id. at 17. While both district courts applied a reasonableness standard, the district
court in K.J. took a context-specific approach, recognizing that school officials are afforded
wider latitude in limiting the expression of younger students and observed, “[c]oncern
about the age-appropriateness of speech is particularly relevant in matters of human sexuality, especially in a middle school atmosphere.” Id. at 18.
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dent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he
could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.”159
Nonetheless, the circuits have taken various approaches to Fraser’s
application to student speech on the Internet. The Second Circuit observed: “It is not clear that Fraser applies to off-campus speech,”160 while
the Third Circuit has held that Fraser only applies to speech or activities
that occur at school.161 The Fourth Circuit suggested “a court could determine that speech originated outside the schoolhouse gate but directed
at persons in school and received by and acted on by them” constituted
in-school speech. “In that case . . . its regulation would be permissible
not only under Tinker, but also as vulgar and lewd in-school speech
under Fraser.”162
C. SPEECH

IN

SCHOOL-SPONSORED ACTIVITIES

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier involved a high school principal’s removal of two articles from a school newspaper that dealt with
teen pregnancy and the impact of divorce on teenagers.163 The newspa159. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). Subsequently, the Court in
Morse v. Frederick echoed Justice Brennan’s view explaining: “[h]ad Fraser delivered the
same speech in a public forum outside of the school context, it would have been protected.”
Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
160. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 49. The Second Circuit in Doninger I noted that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Fraser quoted Judge Newman’s concurring opinion from Thomas.
Id. at 48. One of the points made by Judge Newman in Thomas was: “School authorities
ought to be accorded some latitude to regulate student activity that affects [a] matter of
legitimate concern to the school community and territoriality is not necessarily a useful
concept in determining the limit of that authority.” Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058. Ultimately,
Judge Newman suggested that, “[a] prudent application of the foreseeability concept, informed by First Amendment considerations,” was the appropriate approach to take in this
context. Id. The Doninger I court did not resolve the issue, choosing instead to base its
holding on Tinker and the framework it outlined in its earlier Wisniewski opinion, which
held that Tinker’s test can be applied to a student’s off-campus or Internet speech when it
is “reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach school property.” Doninger I, 527
F.3d at 50.
161. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216. (“It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to
allow the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s home and control his/
her actions there to the same extent it can control that child when he/she participates in
school sponsored activities”); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 45657 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining students cannot be punished for lewd and obscene speech
occurring off school grounds “absent exceptional circumstances”); Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205
F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-800 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (rejecting the application of Fraser because
plaintiff did not compel other students to view his web site and his “expressive activity was
the private viewing of his own website”).
162. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (involving a student’s creation of a webpage, which
served as a platform for other students to direct verbal attacks or cyberbullying on a particular classmate).
163. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 260.
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per was produced as part of the school’s journalism class. The Supreme
Court in Kuhlmeier rejected the student’s claim that the editorial censorship of the school paper violated the First Amendment. The Court concluded that schools do not violate the First Amendment when exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored activities, so long as their actions are “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”164 The Court in Kuhlmeier reiterated:
“A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
“basic educational mission,” even though the government “could not censor similar speech outside the school.”165
The Court in Kuhlmeier explained this exception applies not only to
school sponsored publications, but also to “theatrical productions, and
other expressive activities that students, parents and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,”
and which “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum.”166 The Tenth Circuit applied this exception to a valedictorian’s
speech at a high school graduation.167
The potential for the public’s misperception that speech is sponsored
by a school district should not be a permissible basis to restrict student
speech under Kuhlmeier.168 As the Seventh Circuit explained:
[The school district] proposes to throw up its hands, declaring that because misconceptions are possible it may silence its pupils, that the best
defense against misunderstanding is censorship . . . Public belief that
the government is partial does not permit the government to become
partial. Students therefore may hand out literature even if the recipients would misunderstand its provenance. The school’s proper response
is to educate the audience rather than squelch the speaker . . . schools
may explain that they do not endorse speech by permitting it.169

While Kuhlmeier involves one aspect of student speech, the rationale
underlying the Court’s holding more aptly fits within the so-called “government speech doctrine,”170 which recognizes that the government’s
164. Id. at 273.
165. Id. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
166. Id. at 270-71.
167. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 2009). But
see Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding a student’s speech at graduation did not fall under Kuhlmeier’s exception).
168. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993)
(overturning a school district’s rule which prohibited handing out religious materials on
school grounds).
169. Id. at 1299-1300.
170. See, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188-89 (2007) (noting “it is
well established that the government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech”).
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own speech is generally exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.171 The
government “is ‘entitled to say what it wishes,’ and to select the views
that it wants to express.”172
D. SPEECH ADVOCATING DRUG USE
In Morse v. Frederik, a school district organized a gathering of students
to view the Olympic torch passing the street on which the school was
located.173 There a student unfurled a banner bearing the phrase:
“BONG HiTS 4 Jesus.” The student was suspended for 10 days, and
challenged his suspension arguing that the district could not suspend
him for his off-campus speech. The Supreme Court summarily rejected
that contention noting that the student’s misconduct occurred during
school hours, at a school-approved event thereby making the district’s
rules on student conduct applicable. The Court observed that teachers
were present and charged with supervising the students, the high-school
band and cheerleaders performed, and the plaintiff, who was standing
across the street from his school, directed the banner towards the school
making it visible to most students. In light of this factual backdrop, the
Court concluded: “There is some uncertainty as to when courts should
apply school-speech precedents, but not on these facts.”174
Morse is remarkable not for its holding, but for the Court’s discussion of its prior decisions involving student speech and the efforts made
to limit the opinion’s reach. The Court in Morse explained that its prior
decisions in Fraser and Kuhlmeier demonstrate “that the rule of Tinker
is not the only basis for restricting student speech.”175 The Court observed that Kuhlmeier was inapplicable because the student banner did
not bear “the school’s imprimatur” like the school newspaper in
Kuhlmeier.176 The Court in Morse also rejected the school district’s suggestion that “public school officials [may] censor any student’s speech
171. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (explaining “when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and
we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed
when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message . . . It
does not follow, however, . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors, but instead encourage[s] a diversity of views from private speakers. A holding that the University may
not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does
not restrict the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles”).
172. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009) (quoting
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
173. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
174. Id. at 401 (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 406.
176. Id.
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that interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’ ”177 In a concurring
opinion, several justices explained that Morse provides no support for
any restriction of student speech that arguably comments on political or
social issues.178
1. Does Morse Expand a School’s Authority to Protect Students?
Morse clearly permits schools to address speech that can be reasonably
construed as advocating drug use. Several circuits, however, have interpreted Justice Alioto’s concurrence as expanding a school district’s authority to address threatening speech.
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Morse explained that any alteration of the First Amendment’s application to public schools has to “be
based on some special characteristic of the school’s setting” and the “special characteristic” that was relevant in Morse was “the threat of physical safety to the students.”179 He observed that mandatory “school
attendance can expose students to threats to their physical safety that
they would not otherwise face,” and that “in most cases Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ standard permits school officials to step in before actual violence erupts.”180
The Third Circuit in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, observed
that Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse “emphasizes the narrowness of
the Court’s holding,” and noted that he “only joined the Court’s opinion
‘on the understanding that the opinion does not hold the special characteristics of public schools necessarily justify any other speech
restrictions.’”181
The Fifth Circuit in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District,182
however, interpreted the gloss from Justice Alito’s concurring opinion as
granting school officials greater authority to address threatening speech
in order to protect students from potential violence or harm. In Ponce,
the Fifth Circuit observed: “[I]mportantly, Justice Alito’s concurring
opinion goes on to expand with further clarity why some harms are in
fact so great in the school setting that requiring a school administrator to
evaluate their disruptive potential is unnecessary.”183 The Fifth Circuit
explained: “Speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably grave and
177. Id. at 423 (Alioto, J., concurring). See also Guiles, 461 F.3d at 330 (holding “[t]he
phrase ‘plainly offensive’ as used in Fraser cannot be so broad as to be triggered whenever a
school decides a student’s expression conflicts with its ‘educational mission’ or claims a
legitimate pedagogical concern”).
178. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422-25 (Alito J., concurring).
179. Id. at 424 (Alito J., concurring).
180. Id. at 425.
181. J.S., 650 F.3d at 927.
182. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).
183. Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
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which derives that gravity from the ‘special danger’ to the physical safety
of students arising from the school environment is unprotected.”184
Based on Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse, the Fifth Circuit concluded that if “school administrators are permitted to prohibit school
speech that advocates illegal drug use because illegal drug use presents
a grave and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students, ‘then it defies logical extrapolation to hold high school administrators to a strict standard with respect to speech that gravely and uniquely
threatens violence . . . to the school population as a whole.”185
The Eleventh Circuit in Boim v. Fulton County School District similarly appears to have endorsed the view that Morse grants school administrators greater discretion when addressing student speech threatening
the safety of its students.186 The court in Boim noted: “Recently in
Morse, the Supreme Court broadly held that ‘[t]he special characteristics
of the school environment and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.’ That same rationale
applies equally, if not more, strongly to speech reasonably construed as a
threat of student violence.”187
The Fifth Circuit’s rationale is based on the conclusion that “Tinker
will not always allow school officials to respond to threats of violence
appropriately.”188 So, the Fifth Circuit mined Justice Alito’s concurrence looking for that authority and did so by concluding that it is the
controlling opinion in Morse.189 However, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the suggestion that Justice Alito’s concurrence is controlling. The
Seventh Circuit observed that “Justices Alito and Kennedy . . . joined the
majority opinion not just the decision, and by doing so they made it a
majority opinion and not merely, as the plaintiff believes (as does the
Fifth Circuit), a plurality opinion.”190 In the Seventh Circuit’s view,
“[t]he concurring Justices wanted to emphasize that in allowing a school
to forbid speech that encourages the use of illegal drugs, the Court was
not giving schools carte blanche to regulate student speech. And they
were expressing their own view of the permissible scope of such
184. Id.
185. Id. at 771-72.
186. Boim, 494 F.3d at 984 (citation omitted). Boim involved the expulsion of a high
school student who wrote a story in her notebook about a dream of taking a gun to school
and shooting her math teacher. The court in Boim concluded that there was no First
Amendment right allowing a student to make statements that could be perceived as a
threat of student violence “while on school property during the school day.” Id.
187. Id.
188. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770.
189. Id. at 768; Morgan, 659 F.3d at 374 n.46.
190. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 673.
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regulation.”191
Thus, the lens through which Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is
examined alters one’s view of the scope of Morse’s reach. The Third and
Seventh Circuits view Morse as announcing a relatively narrow holding
addressing speech that advocates drug use, whereas the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits read the decision expansively as granting schools greater
authority than permitted under Tinker to address violent or threatening
speech.
Practically speaking, however, courts are less likely to second guess
the decisions of school administrators when threatening speech is involved because “true threats” are not protected speech.192 Even when a
student’s speech or expressive activities may not technically meet all of
the elements of the true threat exception, courts have not hesitated to
find school officials had a reasonable basis to predict disruption was
likely to occur once knowledge of the threatening speech began to spread
around the school.193 The Eight Circuit recently observed: “The First
Amendment did not require the District to wait and see whether D.J.M.’s
talk about taking a gun to school and shooting certain students would be
carried out.”194
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND INTERNET
STUDENT SPEECH
Students’ Internet activities raise particularly difficult First Amendment issues for school administrators. While the First Amendment’s
protective cloak does not cover “[c]asual chit-chat between two persons or
otherwise confined to a small social group,”195 it does encompass any medium or form of expression “including music, pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints and sculptures,”196
which express “ideas, narratives, concepts, images, opinions—scientific,
political, or aesthetic—to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform,
191. Id.
192. See Section III A and notes 53 - 63. The Fifth Circuit in Ponce noted that the
student’s diary at issue was “much more characteristic of threat speech, which the Supreme Court has held that the government may proscribe without offending the First
Amendment.” 508 F.3d at 772, n.4 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
193. See. e.g., LaVine, 257 F.3d at 981 (upholding a student’s expulsion over a graphic
and violent poem about killing his classmates).
194. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 764.
195. Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich.
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1188 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).
196. ETW Corp. v. Jirek Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)); Douglas v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding “erotic photographs in
‘provocative magazines’ ” enjoy First Amendment protection). Even violent video games
have qualified for First Amendment protection. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733.
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edify or entertain.”197 Student Internet speech or activity also “raises the
metaphysical question of where [a student’s] speech occurred when [the
student] used the Internet as the medium.”198 One of the Internet’s features is that it removes the spatial distance between the person posting
content on the Web and the person viewing that content.
Internet-based student speech decisions have involved a myriad of
fact patterns, and a wide variety of social media. Lower courts have addressed the creation of phony MySpace profiles of school officials;199 the
creation of social networking groups to criticize a teacher or bully a fellow student;200 a student’s web page containing crude and vulgar language;201 a web page with mock obituaries of other students;202 a web
page with a list of classmates who the web site creator wished would
die;203 a web page that gave a list of reasons why a teacher should die
and solicited donations to pay for a “hit man;”204 e-mail or instant
messages (IM) between students that belittled school administrators;205
or threatened to harm fellow students;206 the use of an instant messaging (IM) icon depicting a teacher being shot;207 a slide show posted on
YouTube dramatizing the murder of a teacher;208 “trash talking” on website message boards;209 cyberbullying via a YouTube video;210 provoca197. Swank, 898 F.2d at 1251 (noting that idle chit-chat “is important to its participants
but not to the advancement of knowledge, the transformation of taste, political change,
cultural expression, and the other objectives, values, and consequences of speech that is
protected by the First Amendment”). To the extent that idle chit-chat is protected, Judge
Posner explained in Swank that its protection lies in “the due process clause, along with
other harmless liberties.” Id.
198. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
199. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S., 650 F.3d at 195.
200. Evans v. Baker, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (involving the creation of a
Facebook group titled: “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I ever met,” intended to
allow students to voice their dislike of their teacher); Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (addressing
a group web page criticizing another student which provides a glimpse into cyberbullying).
201. Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
202. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
203. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
204. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 851.
205. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (involving a “top ten” list denigrating a school athletic director that was emailed to friends and was printed and brought to school).
206. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 763-65.
207. Wisniewski v. Board of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.
2007).
208. O.Z. v. Bd. of Trustees, 2008 WL 4396895 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
209. Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704-06 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(involving student discipline for “trash talking” on a website message board regarding an
upcoming volleyball game).
210. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (involving a video posted
on YouTube in which a group of students collectively ganged up on a 13-year-old classmate
by making derogatory, sexual and defamatory statements about her); Kowalski, 652 F.3d
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tive photos posted on students’ Facebook pages;211 threatening Facebook
postings212 and messages disseminated on publicly accessible blogs
targeting school administrators.213 For the most part, the students
worked online from home, although their intended audience generally
was other students from their school.
A number of district courts, while sympathetic to a school district’s
need to maintain a safe and orderly learning environment, nevertheless
enjoined student discipline for Internet speech or statements made on
social networking websites originating from the student’s home.214 In
several instances, the courts concluded that the speech did not involve a
“true threat,”215 or was not lewd,216 or that it was lewd speech but occurred off campus,217 or that a school’s concern over a potential disruption was overblown.218 While a few of these decisions can be explained
at 567-68 (addressing a group web page on MySpace which targeted a classmate for abuse
and ridicule).
211. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2011 WL 3501698, at *1-2 (involving photos of 15
and 16-year-old high-school girls posing with rainbow-colored, phallic-shaped lollipops and
toy tridents).
212. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 822 (addressing a University student’s Facebook postings
which referenced a “Death List” and wanting to “stab” someone).
213. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48.
214. See, e.g., Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090; Killion,
136 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
215. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (involving a student-created web page with mock
obituaries of other students that allowed visitors to vote on who should be the next to “die”
and have their obituary posted on the site). The obituaries in Emmett were written tonguein-cheek and were inspired by a creative writing class in which students were assigned to
write their own obituaries. The court concluded that no evidence was presented that the
mock obituaries and voting on the site were intended to threaten anyone or that anyone
actually felt threatened. See also Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 785-86 (granting summary
judgment on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim stemming from a one semester suspension
from school for creating a web site titled “Satan’s web page” which listed “people I wish
would die”). The website also contained “SATAN’S MISSION FOR YOU THIS WEEK” and
stated: “Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw them off of a cliff, watch
them suffer with their last breath, just before everything goes black, spit on their face.
Killing people is wrong don’t do It [sic]. Unless [sic] Im [sic] there to watch. Or just go
Detroit. Hell is right in the middle. Drop by and say hi. PS: NOW THAT YOU’VE READ
MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON’T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND STUFF THEN BLAMING
IT ON ME. OK?” Id. at 782. The district court in Mahaffey concluded, “a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s place would not foresee that the statement on [his] website would be interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or kill anyone on the website.” Id. at
786.
216. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (describing a student’s web page as “crude” but noting
that it did not have the “ ‘elaborate, graphic and explicit sexual metaphor[s]’ at issue in
Fraser”).
217. See, e.g., Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599; Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799-800; Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 456-57.
218. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (enjoining a student’s suspension for creating a
web page critical of his high school using crude and vulgar language where the evidence
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by a failure of proof,219 or by a disagreement over the proper test for
determining whether a statement qualifies as a “true threat,”220 the reasoning of several of the decisions is difficult to reconcile,221 and as explained in the next section of this article, a split in the circuits has
developed.222
While these district court decisions are too numerous to comprehensively discuss, one point bears mentioning. Several of the decisions that
found a First Amendment violation for disciplining a student’s Internet
activities223 were based on the Second Circuit’s decision in Thomas v.
Board of Education.224 Thomas held that school officials violated the
First Amendment when they disciplined high school students for an underground newspaper that was primarily published and distributed off
campus and had “minimal” contacts with the school.225 An important,
but frequently overlooked point about Thomas is that the school district
viewed the underground paper as meeting the test for obscenity, which
meant it did not fall under the shield of the First Amendment.226 The
Second Circuit disagreed with the school district’s argument on that issue. Moreover, Judge Newman, in his concurring opinion, explained
that the school authorities in Thomas “disclaimed any interest in disciplining students for activity [o]ff school property and the students . . .
revealed the suspension was imposed not based on any fear of disruption but because the
school principal was upset over the content of the web page).
219. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01 (concluding “there is no evidence from which
at reasonable jury could conclude this incident caused a material and substantial disruption of school operations”); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (noting “defendants failed to
adduce any evidence of actual disruption”); Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., 2005 WL
2106562, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (enjoining a student’s expulsion in light of a school
official’s testimony that the student’s violent rap songs did not cause any disruptions prior
to his expulsion).
220. See Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 785-86 (noting a conflict in the federal circuits
and explaining the Sixth Circuit’s true threat test is whether “a reasonable person would
foresee that [a] statement would be interpreted by those to whom [it was communicated] as
a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.
221. One district court after surveying the law on this issue concluded: “[W]hen it comes
to student cyber-speech, the lower courts are in complete disarray handing down ad hoc
decisions that, even when they reach an instinctively correct conclusion, lack consistent
controlling legal principles.” Doninger v. Neihoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 224 (D. Conn. 2009),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
222. J.S., 650 F.3d at 950 (Fisher J., dissenting) (explaining the Third Circuit’s en banc
decision creates a split with the Second Circuit).
223. See Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 457; Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
224. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1043.
225. Id. at 1045, 1050 (holding school officials exceeded the scope of their authority and
violated the First Amendment for disciplining students for an “off-campus publication”
modeled on the National Lampoon containing articles on masturbation and prostitution
and having minimal contacts with the school).
226. Id. at 1051-52.
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demanded, but [had] not yet exercised, the right to distribute their publication [o]n school property.”227 In other words, the school authorities
“thought the on-campus activity was significant” but the Second Circuit
in Thomas again disagreed with the school authorities on that point.228
Subsequently, the Second Circuit restricted the scope of Thomas’
holding in several decisions addressing students’ use of the Internet and
social media. Wisniewski v. Board of Education229 involved a student’s
First Amendment challenge to his speech that occurred off-campus. The
student was disciplined for “instant messages” that he sent to classmates
from his home, which included an icon depicting a teacher being shot.
The Second Circuit in Wisniewski held that Tinker could be applied to
the student’s speech despite the fact that it occurred away from school
property.230 The Wisniewski court recalled that in Thomas it specifically
had envisioned a case in which a group of students incited “substantial
disruption within the school from some remote locale.”231 In Doninger v.
Neihoff, the Second Circuit subsequently rejected the suggestion that
Thomas “clearly established that off-campus speech-related conduct may
never be the basis for discipline by school officials.”232
Since the Second Circuit’s holding in Thomas provides the doctrinal
foundation for a number of district court decisions finding a First
Amendment violation involving student speech, those decisions have to
be examined in light of the Second Circuit’s subsequent decisions in Wisniewski and Doninger. For example, in O.Z. v. Board of Trustees,233 the
district court addressed a student’s First Amendment claim involving a
YouTube slide show the student created which depicted the murder of a
school-teacher. In O.Z., school officials became aware of the slide show
only after the teacher ran a Google search on her name and found it on
YouTube. Although the slide show was created off-campus, because it
reached the teacher and the school principal, the district court applied
Wisniewski and concluded that the slide show “created a foreseeable risk
of disruption within the school.”234
VI. THE CIRCUITS’ VARIOUS APPROACHES TO
INTERNET SPEECH
This section discusses the leading federal appellate circuit decisions
that have addressed the First Amendment rights of students involving
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 1053 (Newman J., concurring) (alteration in original).
Id. at 1054 (Newman, J., concurring).
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34.
Id. at 39.
Id. (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17); see also Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 347.
Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 347 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39).
O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
Id. at *4.
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their use of the Internet. It highlights the circuit split that has developed regarding Internet speech.
A. SECOND CIRCUIT
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District235 involved the instant messages (IMs) of an eighth-grade student
sent from his computer at home to the home computers of other students
on his buddy list. The particular instant messaging program allowed
users to create an avatar or icon that could be displayed on the computer
screens of those exchanging IMs. The icon identified the person sending
or receiving a message. The particular icon involved in Wisniewski was a
crude drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head with dots of
splattered blood. Beneath the icon appeared the statement: “Kill Mr.
VanderMolen,” who was the student’s English teacher. The student sent
instant messages with this icon to 15 members of his buddy list over a
three-week period. The icon was never sent electronically to any school
official. However, the icon eventually came to the attention of other students, one of whom informed Mr. VanderMolen about it and later provided him with a copy.236 The student subsequently was suspended for
one semester, and his parents sued claiming the suspension violated the
First Amendment.
The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the district finding no First Amendment violation. The court in Wisniewski chose not to
base its decision on whether the icon constituted a “true threat” under
Watts. Rather, the court based its holding on Tinker’s substantial disruption test.237 The Second Circuit held “it was reasonably foreseeable
that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities and the
teacher whom the icon depicted being shot” given the threatening content of the icon and the extensive distribution of it, which encompassed
“15 recipients, including some of [the student’s] classmates, during a
three week circulation period.”238 The court further explained that once
the icon was “made known to the teacher and other school officials, [it]
would create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.”239 In the Second Circuit’s view, it made no difference whether or
not the student “intended his icon to be communicated to school authorities or, if communicated, to cause a substantial disruption.”240
235. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34.
236. Id. at 35-36.
237. Id. at 37-38.
238. Id. at 39-40.
239. Id. at 40.
240. Id. The Fourth Circuit recently followed the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability approach in its Hannibal decision addressing Internet messages between two students where one student indicated he would borrow a .357 Magnum and shoot other
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Doninger v. Neihoff addressed a student’s statements made on her
publicly accessible blog hosted by livejournal.com, which inaccurately reported that an annual battle of the bands held at the school had been
cancelled. The student’s message referred to school officials as “douche
bags,” and encouraged others to write or call the school district’s superintendent “to piss her off more.” School administrators received a number
of phone calls, e-mails and personal visits from students. For several
days the school administrators had to deal with the resulting controversy. Ultimately, the school refused to allow the plaintiff to run for senior class office or to take office after winning a plurality of votes as a
write-in candidate.
The Second Circuit in Doninger explained: “a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct occurring off school grounds, when this
conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment,’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that
the off-campus expression might also reach [the] campus.”241 Because
the student’s postings resulted in a deluge of phone calls and e-mails
from upset students, which required the attention of the school administrators for several days, this was held sufficient to meet Tinker’s substantial disruption test.
B. THIRD CIRCUIT
In a pair of en banc decisions addressing phony MySpace profiles of
school principals, the Third Circuit held that the students’ Internet
speech was protected by the First Amendment and that school officials
were powerless to discipline the students despite the disturbing content
of the profiles created by the students.242 In both cases, the students
used an actual photo of the principal in creating the phony profile, which
was cut and pasted from the school district’s website.
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District involved an eighth grade student who created a fake MySpace profile of her school principal, identified as “a bisexual Alabama middle school principal named ‘M-Hoe.’ ”243
While J.S. claimed the profile was intended to be a joke between herself
and her friends, she created it after the principal had twice disciplined
students. While the Fourth Circuit held the statements constituted a true threat and were
not protected speech under the First Amendment, Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 764-65, it also
applied Tinker as an alternative basis to uphold the student discipline. The court concluded, “it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s threats about shooting specific students in school would be brought to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment.” Id. at 766.
241. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).
242. J.S., 650 F.3d at 920.
243. Id. at 920.
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her for dress code violations.244 The profile was filled with “crude content and vulgar language,” and was laced with “profanity and shameful
personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family.”245 The URL for
the profile ended with the phrase “kidsrockmybed.”246
Initially, the profile could be viewed by anyone with access to the
Internet.247 However, after several students approached J.S. at school
the next day to tell her that they thought the profile was funny, she
marked it “private,” which limited access of the profile to students who
were her MySpace friends. Two days after the profile was created, a student who had seen the profile told the principal about it and, at the principal’s request, provided a printout of the profile to him.
J.S. initially denied any involvement with the profile but eventually
admitted her role in creating it. The school district concluded the profile
violated its disciplinary code and suspended J.S. for ten days. The principal contacted MySpace and was able to have the profile taken down.
The principal also contacted the police about possibly pressing criminal
charges. While J.S. and her mother were called to the police station to
discuss the profile, no criminal charges were ever pursued.
The student’s parents challenged her suspension arguing the First
Amendment prevented the district from disciplining their daughter for
writing the vulgar and offensive statements about her principal. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school district
by essentially combining Fraser and Morse’s standards.248 The district
court held the student’s “vulgar, lewd and potentially illegal speech . . .
had an effect on campus,” and concluded the school district did not violate the First Amendment in punishing J.S. for it.249
A panel of the Third Circuit initially affirmed the district court, concluding that while the profile was created off-campus, Tinker was applicable because of its potential to cause substantial disruption at the
244. Id.
245. Id. The profile listed the principal’s interests as “riding the fraintrain, spending
time with my child (who looks like a gorilla) . . . fucking in my office, hitting on students
and their parents.” Id. at 920. The profile described the principal as a “sex addict,” and as a
“fagass put in the world with a small dick, Principal” and stated that he loved “children,
sex (any kind) . . . and my darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs)
MYFRAINTRAIN.” Id. at 921. The profile’s references to “fraintrain” were to the principal’s wife, Debra Frain who worked as a guidance counselor at the school. J.S., 650 F.3d at
921, 923.
246. Id. at 941 (Fisher J., concurring) (the URL was http://www.myspace.com/
kidsrockmybed).
247. One district court has observed that, “MySpace.com is the most visited web site in
the United States.” MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
248. J.S., 650 F.3d at 923.
249. J.S., 2008 WL 4279517, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 915.

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-2\SFT201.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 39

TINKERING WITH FIRST AMENDMENT

27-FEB-13

9:35

205

school.250 The panel concluded the student profile demonstrated “a reasonable possibility of future disruption” because it made offensive “insinuation[s] that strike at the heart of the [principal’s] fitness to serve in
the capacity of a middle school principal.”251 The panel recognized that
Tinker also permits schools to regulate student speech when it invades
the rights of others, but noted that it did not have to address that issue
since it already had determined that the student speech “presented a
reasonable threat of substantial disruption” to the school.252
Because the panel’s decision in J.S. ostensibly conflicted with another panel decision issued the same day in Layshock v. Hermitage
School District,253 the Third Circuit granted rehearing en banc, and reversed the district court in J.S. in an eight-to-six ruling.254
The majority in J.S. assumed without deciding that Tinker applied
to the student’s speech. It concluded that plaintiff’s speech did not cause
a substantial disruption in school.255 While recognizing that a “School
District need not prove with certainty that substantial disruption will
occur,”256 the court concluded the facts did not support the conclusion
“that a forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable” under the circumstances.257 The majority compared the school district’s evidence of
disruption in J.S.—general rumblings around the school about the profile, a few instances of students talking in class about it, and some school
officials having to rearrange their schedules—with the record in Tinker
and found it similarly lacking, “despite the unfortunate humiliation”
which the profile caused the principal.258
The court summarily rejected the district’s argument that substantial disruption was likely to occur because the profile would engender
“suspicions among the school community about the [principal’s] character because of [its] references to his engaging in sexual misconduct.” The
250. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), rehearing en
banc granted and opinion vacated, 2010 LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. April 9, 2010) (“off-campus
speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause substantial disruption of or a material
interference with a school need not satisfy any geographical technicality in order to be
regulated pursuant to Tinker”).
251. Id. at 302.
252. Id. at 301 n.9.
253. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc
granted and opinion vacated, (3d Cir. June 13, 2011).
254. J.S., 650 F.3d at 920, 941.
255. Id. at 928 (noting “the School District’s counsel conceded this point at oral
argument”).
256. Id. (citing Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 51; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591-92; LaVine, 257 F.3d
at 989).
257. Id. at 928. The court in J.S. reiterated “Tinker requires a specific and significant
fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of a disturbance.” Id. at 926 (quoting
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211).
258. Id. at 929-30.
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court did so by noting “[t]he profile was so outrageous that no one could
have taken it seriously.”259 However, the court also recognized “that the
vulgar and offensive speech such as that employed in this case—even
made in jest—could damage the careers of teachers and
administrators.”260
The court in J.S. readily concluded that Fraser was inapplicable because Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.261 The fact that a
printed copy of the profile was brought to school at the principal’s request did not transform the student’s “off-campus speech into school
speech.”262 While recognizing that Tinker also addressed speech that invades the rights of others, the court limited the application of Tinker’s
second prong to students, noting, “if that portion of Tinker is broadly construed, an assertion of virtually any rights could transcend and eviscerate the protections of the First Amendment.”263 However, Tinker itself
explained that neither students, nor teachers shed their constitutional
rights in our public schools.264 Thus, as explained in Section VII of this
article, both students and teachers should be able to invoke the protection of Tinker’s rights of others prong.
Five members of the majority filed a concurring opinion in J.S. in
which they expressed the view that Tinker does not apply to off-campus
speech and “that the First Amendment protects students engaging in offcampus speech to the same extent it protects citizens in the community
at large.”265 However, the concurring judges also recognized the difficulty in determining whether digital-age speech takes place on campus
or off-campus, and concluded: “The answer plainly cannot turn solely on
where the speaker is sitting when the speech was originally uttered.”266
The concurring judges in J.S. were willing to apply Tinker to a case
where a student sends “a disruptive e-mail to school faculty from his
home computer.” They explained: “Regardless of its place of origin,
speech intentionally directed towards a school is properly considered oncampus speech.”267 Parting ways with the Second Circuit, they observed
259. J.S., 650 F.3d at 930.
260. Id. at 929 n.7.
261. Id. at 932. “Fraser’s lewdness standard cannot be extended to justify a school’s
punishment of J.S. for [her] use of profane language outside the school, during non-school
hours.” Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 931 n.9 (stating “[w]e are not aware of any decisions analyzing whether this
language applies to anyone other than students”).
264. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
265. J.S., 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith J., concurring).
266. Id. at 940.
267. A majority of the judges in the Third Circuit (the five concurring and six dissenting
judges in J.S.) agreed that Tinker could be applied to at least some types of student speech
on the Internet.
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“speech originating off campus does not mutate into on-campus speech
simply because it foreseeably makes its way onto campus.”268
The dissent characterized the court’s holding as “severely undermining the authority of school officials to perform their jobs,” and accused
the majority of failing to recognize the harmful effect that accusations of
sexual misconduct would have on the principal and the school community.269 They noted that students and parents unfamiliar with the principal would have “serious questions” about his character and actions, and
that school administrators would have to spend a considerable amount of
time alleviating their concerns.270 Therefore, the profile’s potential to
cause substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable and that was
sufficient under Tinker.
That the plaintiff did not intend the profile to reach the school was
immaterial in the dissent’s view.271 The dissent agreed that “[t]he line
between ‘on-campus’ and ‘off-campus’ speech is not as clear as it once
was” in part because “Internet use among teens is nearly universal.”272
It observed that students today “carry cell phones with internet capabilities onto school grounds” which provide “near-constant student access to
social networking sites.” The dissent concluded that the majority’s reasoning “that hostile and offensive online speech will not reach the school”
was simply untenable.273
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District,274 a high-school senior
created a “parody profile” of his principal, which he posted on MySpace.
Among other things, the profile indicated that the principal smoked marijuana, was a drunk, and a “big steroid freak.”275 Plaintiff allowed
other students to have access to the profile by listing them as friends on
the MySpace profile page. The court noted that “word of the profile
‘spread like wildfire’ and soon reached most, if not all, of the [high
school’s] student body, and three other fake profiles about the principal
were found posted on MySpace.276 The principal learned of one of these
268. Id.
269. Id. at 945. The dissent explained, “stating that the principal of a middle school has
sex in his office and is a ‘sex addict’ who enjoys ‘hitting on children and their parents’ are
serious allegations that cannot be taken lightly by any school official or by our Court.” Id.
at 949.
270. Id. at 945-46.
271. J.S., 650 F.3d at 951.
272. Id. at 951 (citing Amanda Lenhart, et al., Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW INTERNET
(April 20, 2010), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Teens-and-mobile-Phones.aspx, for
the proposition that 93 percent of teenagers use the internet and 61 percent use it daily”).
273. Id. (stating that, “66 percent of students receive a cell phone before the age of 14,
and slightly less than 75 percent of high school students have a cell phone”).
274. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205 (en banc).
275. Id. at 208.
276. Id.
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other profiles from his daughter who was in the eleventh grade.277
The principal found the profiles were “degrading, demeaning, demoralizing and shocking.” He was also concerned about his reputation
and complained to the local police.278 However, just as in J.S., no criminal charges were ever filed over any of the profiles. The school district
found that plaintiff’s creation of the fake profile violated its disciplinary
code. The school district suspended plaintiff for ten days, placed him in
an alternative education program at the high school for the remainder of
the school year, banned him from participating in all extracurricular activities and from participating in his graduation ceremony.279
The plaintiff in Layshock challenged the school district’s disciplinary
decision. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school officials but against the school district on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. It ruled that the school district failed to “establish a substantial nexus between [the student’s] speech and a substantial
disruption of the school environment.”280 It further concluded that the
Court’s decision in Fraser did not permit schools to “punish lewd and
profane off-campus speech,” and that there was “no evidence that [the
student] engaged in any lewd or profane speech while in school.”281
The Third Circuit began its en banc opinion by noting the school district did not argue, “that it could properly punish [the student] under
Tinker.” Rather, the school district took the position that Fraser could be
invoked because a sufficient nexus existed to regulate the speech. It
pointed to the fact that the student had entered the school district’s web
site to copy the principal’s picture, the speech was aimed at the school
community and the profile had been accessed on campus by the
plaintiff.282
The court found the district’s argument about plaintiff entering the
district’s WEBSITE to copy the principal’s photo was “unpersuasive at
best,” holding the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Thomas far more compelling because there “all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity . . . was designed to take place beyond the school house gate.”283 The
Layshock court found the relationship between the student’s conduct and
the school far more attenuated than in Thomas.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 209.
279. Id. at 210. The court in Layshock also noted that prior to creating the MySpace
profile, plaintiff was classified as a “gifted student,” was the only student who was punished for the MySpace profiles and was the only student to apologize for his actions.
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210.
280. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600, aff’d, 650 F.3d at 205 (en banc).
281. Id. at 599-600.
282. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214.
283. Id. at 215 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050).
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While recognizing “Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed
solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the school yard,” Layshock
further observed, “the concept of the ‘school yard’ is not without boundaries and the reach of school authorities is not without limits.”284 The
court sloughed off the school district’s remaining nexus arguments explaining, “schools may punish expressive conduct that occurs outside of
the school, as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate,’ under certain
very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”285
The Third Circuit in Layshock comes close to melding two conceptually distinct concepts in arriving at its holding—whether or not the
Internet speech occurs on-campus or off, and whether or not substantial
disruption occurred—when it observed:
We need not now define the precise parameters of when the arm of authority can reach beyond the schoolhouse gate because . . . the district
court found that [the student’s] conduct did not disrupt the school, and
the District does not appeal that finding. Thus, we need only hold that
[the student’s] use of the District’s web site does not constitute entering
the school, and that the District is not empowered to punish his out of
school conduct under the circumstances here.286

A concurring opinion was filed in Layshock to clarify “whether school
administrators can, consistent with the First Amendment, discipline students for speech that occurs off campus.”287 The concurring judges in
Layshock wished to emphasize that Tinker can be applied to off-campus
speech, and observed that “no ruling coming out today is to the contrary.”288 Recalling that the First Amendment does not permit a person
to falsely shout fire in a theatre, the concurring judges noted “it is hard
to see how words that may cause a pandemonium in a public school
would be protected by the First Amendment simply because technology
now allows the timing and distribution of a shout to be controlled by
someone beyond the campus boundary.”289
The concurring judges in Layshock aptly observed that the on-campus/off-campus definitional exercise that occurs with Internet student
speech claims “only obscures the effort to answer the central dilemma,
which is to balance the need for order in our public schools with the respect for free speech.”290 They also posit:
284. Id. at 216.
285. Id. at 219.
286. Id.
287. Id. (Jordan J., concurring).
288. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220 (referring to the Third Circuit’s en banc Layshock and
J.S. decisions announced the same day).
289. Id. at 221-22 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
290. Id. at 221.
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Just as society’s interest in public safety surmounts any claim of right
to raise a false fire alarm, by the same token, any claimed right to
spread scurrilous falsehoods about school administrators may well be
outweighed by society’s legitimate interest in the orderly administration of public schools.291

C. FOURTH CIRCUIT
In Kowalski v. Berkley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit held a
student’s web page, created from her home, which targeted a fellow student for harassment, could be addressed under Tinker.292 The web page
was titled “S.A.S.H” which stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes.”
Plaintiff invited approximately 100 of her MySpace friends to join the
group.293 The first classmate to join the group uploaded a photo of himself and another student holding a sign that read, “Shay has Herpes.”
Two additional photos were uploaded to the web page, one of which had a
picture of the targeted student with a caption “portrait of a whore” added
to it, and a second photo was edited to add red dots to the student’s face
to simulate herpes.294
The day after the web page was posted, the targeted student and her
parents filed a harassment complaint with the school district concerning
the discussion group. The targeted student did not attend school that
day because she was uncomfortable being in classes with the students
who posted comments about her on the web page.295 The school district
concluded that plaintiff created a “hate web site” in violation of the district’s policy on harassment, bullying and intimidation.296 The school
district imposed a ten-day suspension and a ninety-day “social suspension.” Plaintiff then claimed the school administrators violated her First
Amendment rights by punishing her for speech that occurred outside the
school.297
The Fourth Circuit in Kowalski rejected plaintiff’s First Amendment
argument, concluding that public schools have a “compelling interest” in
291. Id. at 222. The concurring judges in Layshock further added that they “do not
subscribe to any implication that Tinker is inapplicable and that school officials would have
been powerless to head off a substantial disruption.” Id.
292. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572-73. The Court in Kowalski recognized: “There is surely a
limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gates. But . . . we are
satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out
their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.” Id. at 573.
293. Id. at 567.
294. Id. at 568.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 569.
297. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 570.
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regulating speech that involves “student harassment and bullying.”298
The court found it was foreseeable that the comments posted on the web
page “would reach the school via computers, smart phones and other
electronic devices,” since most of the web page’s group members and the
student targeted for the harassment were classmates at the high
school.299
While recognizing that there was a limit to the scope of a school district’s interest “in the order, safety and well being of its students when
the speech originates outside the schoolhouse gate,” the court in Kowalski held there was a sufficient “nexus between the offending speech and
school’s pedagogical interests in carrying out their role as the trustees of
the student body’s well being.”300 Kowalski is significant in that the
Fourth Circuit recognized a school district’s authority to intervene under
Tinker when the offending speech interferes with another student’s right
to be left alone.301
D. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The Eighth Circuit in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No.
60 applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability approach to
Tinker’s substantial disruption test.302 Hannibal, like the Second Circuit’s decision in Wisniewski, involved a student’s instant messages.
This time, however, it was the student’s messages, rather than an avatar
which threatened the harm. The student’s instant messages in Hannibal were sent to another student and discussed borrowing a “357 magnum” from a friend and shooting members of some groups he did not like,
which he described as “midget[s], fags and negro bitches.”303
While the court in Hannibal held those messages were “true
threats,” and therefore, did not constitute protected speech,304 the court
also held “it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s threats about
shooting specific students in school would be brought to the attention of
school authorities and create a risk of substantial disruption in
298. Id. at 572 (citing DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 319-20).
299. Id. at 574.
300. Id. at 573.
301. Id. at 572 (holding school administrators must be able to prevent and punish harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school environment conducive to learning).
302. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 766.
303. Id. at 758.
304. Id. at 765 (holding there was no First Amendment violation because “school officials would have exposed the District to what reasonably appeared to them as a serious
risk of harm to students and disruption of the school environment if no action had been
taken in response to D.J.M.’s threatening instant messages which met the court’s test for
true threats”).
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school.”305
E. THE SPLIT

CIRCUITS INVOLVING TINKER
INTERNET SPEECH

IN THE

AND

The six dissenting judges in J.S. concluded that the court’s decision
“causes a split with the Second Circuit.”306 The majority, however, disagreed with the dissent’s suggestion that a circuit split had resulted, arguing that the Second Circuit’s decisions in Wisniewski and Doninger
were distinguishable on the facts and were based on the record presented
in each case.307
Perhaps the J.S. majority’s view on the circuit split was influenced
by its five concurring members who concluded that Tinker can be applied
to student Internet speech that is “intentionally directed towards the
school.”308 By applying that standard, the concurring judges in J.S. may
have reached the same result in Doninger, because the student speech at
issue in Doninger specifically targeted school officials for disruption.309
The instant messages at issue in Wisniewski, on the other hand, were not
directed at the school; they were sent to the student’s classmates at their
homes with no request that they be forwarded to the school or school
officials.310 Thus, it seems doubtful that the concurring judges in J.S.
would have reached the same result in Wisniewski. It is also an open
question whether the concurring judges in J.S. would have reached the
same result as the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski, where the student speech
involved a group web page which targeted another student, rather than
the school itself, for harassment.311
The majority’s approach in J.S. also conflicts with the Second,
Fourth and Eighth Circuits over the appropriate test to apply under
Tinker for predicting future disruption stemming from student Internet
speech. The Second Circuit adopted a reasonable foreseeability test in
305. Id. at 765-66. The court in Hannibal noted that school officials spent considerable
time responding to calls from parents and students about a rumored hit list explaining
what safety measures were in place. In the Court’s view, this was sufficient to establish
substantial disruption under Tinker.
306. J.S., 650 F.3d at 950 (Fisher, J. dissenting).
307. Id. at 931 n.8.
308. Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring) (explaining the concurring judges “would have no
difficulty applying Tinker to a case where a student sent a disruptive email to school
faculty from his home computer”).
309. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 45 (noting the student encouraged others to contact the
school district’s administrators).
310. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36.
311. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574 (discussing “the targeted, defamatory nature of [the student’s] speech aimed at a fellow classmate”).
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Wisniewski,312 which the Fourth Circuit applied in Kowalski,313 and the
Eighth Circuit followed in Hannibal.314 The Third Circuit in J.S., however, specifically rejected a foreseeability approach.315 The concurring
judges in J.S. observed that student speech which originates off-campus
does not “mutate into on-campus speech simply because it foreseeably
makes its way onto campus.”316
The Seventh Circuit rejected the suggestion that a school district
must prove that speech will cause “disorder or disturbance” unless it is
suppressed. It explained that a school district is not “required to prove
that unless the speech at issue is forbidden, serious consequences will in
fact ensue . . . It is enough for the school to present ‘facts which might
reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption.”317
The majority in J.S., however, summarily rejected the information upon
which the school district acted. By concluding that the student’s speech
“was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously,”318 the
Third Circuit in J.S. substituted its judgment for that of the school administrators, and in the process appeared to require proof that substantial disruption would in fact occur.
VII. APPLYING TINKER TO INTERNET SPEECH
This section of the article discusses the proper scope of Tinker’s
rights of others prong involving Internet speech. It also explains why the
off-campus/on-campus distinction that has arisen involving the First
Amendment rights of students is unworkable when it comes to Internet
speech.
The application of Tinker’s rights of others prong is particularly im312. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40 (holding “it was reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon
would come to the attention of school authorities,” and that “there can be no doubt that the
icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably create a
risk of substantial disruption in the school environment”). See also Doninger I, 527 F.3d at
50 (noting the student’s internet posting created a risk of substantial disruption).
313. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574 (“it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s conduct
would reach the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices”).
314. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 765-66 (discussing Wisniewski and concluding that “it was
reasonably foreseeable that [the student’s] threats about shooting other students would be
brought to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial disruption
within the school environment”).
315. J.S., 650 F.3d at 626 (observing that “Tinker requires a specific and significant fear
of disruption”) (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211).
316. Id. at 640 (Smith, J. concurring).
317. Nuxol, 523 F.3d at 673 (emphasis in original) (quoting Boucher, 134 F.3d at 82728).
318. Id. at 930.
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portant for combating cyberbullying among students.319 Cyberbullying
is a growing problem in our schools.320 Studies have demonstrated that
cyberbullying can cause various psychosocial problems in students including anxiety, depression and in extreme cases, can lead to adolescent
suicide.321 Besides lowering the victim’s self esteem, cyberbullying also
can heighten the victim’s insecurity, lead to increased absences and truancy, negatively impact his or her academic performance and lower
achievement scores.322 Noticeable drops in academic performance have
been attributed to poorer concentration in class and heightened levels of
frustration at school and home as a result of the bullying.323
Since an individual student is frequently the target of the bullying,324 at times it may be difficult for school officials to intervene because
of difficulty in forecasting substantial disruption that would otherwise be
required. The application of Tinker’s rights of others prong would allow
school officials to address bullying cyberspeech which impairs or threatens to impair a student’s educational performance or the student’s abil319. Many definitions of cyberbullying can be found in various state statutes or on the
Internet. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyberbulling Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (Feb.
2012), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf (indicating
that forty-six states have anti-bullying laws, thirty-five of which include electronic harassment, and that forty-five states have laws mandating school bullying or cyberbullying policies, thirty-nine of which involve school sanctions). However it is defined, cyberbullying
typically involves “the use of modern communication technology to embarrass, humiliate,
threaten, or intimidate an individual.” Glenn R. Stutzky, Cyber Bullying Information, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY & SOCIAL RESEARCH (2011), http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/Forums/2006_Mar_CYBER_BULLYING_INFORMATION_2006%20—%20Provided
%20by%20Mr.%20Glenn%20Stutzky.pdf.
320. See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., CRIME, VIOLENCE, DISCIPLINE AND SAFETY IN U.S. PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 12 (May 2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011320.pdf (indicating
approximately nineteen percent of middle school administrators surveyed indicated that
they had to deal with cyberbullying daily or at least once per week); Sameer Hinduja &
Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Victimization, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (2010),
http://cyberbullying.us/2010_charts/cyberbullying_victim_2010.jpg (indicating that approximately twenty percent of students between the ages of ten and eighteen from a sample of
4441 students reported that they had been the victim of cyberbullying).
321. See, e.g., Robert S. Tokunaga, Following You Home from School: A Critical Review
and Synthesis of Research on Cyberbullying Victimization, 26 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BE277, 281 (2010), available at http://icbtt.arizonia.edu/sites/default/files/
HAVIOR
tokunaga,_r_cyberbullying.pdf. See also Price v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 37090, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2012) (observing plaintiffs’ daughter who had been subjected to bullying
by her classmates suffered “posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety,” was
taking a prescription antidepressant, experienced nightmares, declining grades, social isolation and was unable to participate in extracurricular school activities).
322. Price, 2012 WL 37090, at *4.
323. Id.
324. Todd D. Erb, Note, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ, ST. L.J. 257, 274 (2008).
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ity to interact with peers at school, even in the absence of predictable
disruption at the school. Recognition of Tinker’s rights of others prong
also provides the means to address a student’s threatening speech that
targets other students or school officials which does not meet the elements of a “true threat.” This approach would avoid having to stretch to
find that authority to address threatening speech in Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse.325
A. SPEECH THAT INVADES

THE

RIGHTS

OF

OTHERS

Only a handful of decisions have discussed Tinker’s rights of others
prong since Tinker was decided over four decades ago.326 Several of the
courts that have addressed Tinker’s second prong observed that its scope
is “unclear.”327 There are several probable reasons for this conclusion.
First, school districts have not raised the issue in the lower courts or on
appeal. Second, mere name-calling, derogatory comments, and teasing
are not actionable.328 By the same token, there is no constitutional right
to be a bully, or to abuse or intimidate other students.329 Additionally,
the disciplinary infractions may not have resulted in sanctions severe
enough to trigger a court challenge. Finally, courts are reluctant to unnecessarily venture into the uncharted boundaries of harassing speech
and the First Amendment.330 However, with school districts facing potential liability under Title IX for claims involving student-on-student
harassment,331 and with the growth of cyberbullying,332 Tinker’s rights
of others prong takes on greater importance.
325. See the discussion in Section IV, D 1, and notes 159-171.
326. See, e.g., Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 516-20; Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375; Bystrom by
Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch. Indian Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 747, 752 (8th Cir. 1987); Saxe, 240
F.3d at 217; Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177-80; Defoe, 625 F.3d at 334.
327. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217; Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178.
328. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999).
329. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 264.
330. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 877 (noting “the very real tension between antiharassment
laws and the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech”) (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at
209).
331. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646-47 (holding school boards can be held liable under Title IX
for deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment). The United States Department of Education has also taken the position that school districts can be held liable under
Title IX for failing to discipline student “emails and web sites of a sexual nature.” See also
Price, 2012 WL 37090, at **6-8 (rejecting a school district’s motion to dismiss a Title IX
claim stemming from the bullying of plaintiff’s daughter by a group of classmates even
though school administrators punished several of the classmates and met with the parents
of those students in an unsuccessful attempt to stop their harassment); U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: BULLYING AND HARASSMENT 6
(Oct. 26, 2010), available athttp://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet201010.pdf.
332. See U. S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 320, at 12.
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The Eighth Circuit, in several early decisions, suggested that
Tinker’s second prong is limited to “tortious speech” such as libel, slander
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.333 Those decisions, however, arose in the context of the type of information school officials could
exercise editorial control over school-sponsored publications,334 and the
Supreme Court in Kuhlmeier held that schools could exercise editorial
control over school sponsored expressive activities so long as their decisions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”335 As
a result, the Supreme Court in Kuhlmeier did not address whether the
Eighth Circuit “correctly construed Tinker as precluding school speech to
avoid ‘invad[ing] the rights of others,’ except where that speech could
result in tort liability to the school.”336
Later decisions suggest the Eighth Circuit’s “tort-liability” test for
Tinker’s rights of others prong is both over and under inclusive. The Supreme Court recently recognized that the First Amendment provides a
defense to state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
when the speech involves a matter of public concern.337 The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation also would render school administrators powerless
to address student speech that does not meet the technical requirements
of a tort claim under their state’s common law.338 School administrators
are not trained legal professionals who have the background to accurately assess whether a student’s speech is tortious in nature. More importantly, however, school administrators should be allowed to address
student harassment and bullying on the internet even when it may not
meet the elements of a common-law tort in order to maintain an atmosphere conducive to learning.
The Ninth Circuit in Harper v. Poway Unified School District,339
held that a school district could ban a student t-shirt that was highly
critical of homosexuality340 under Tinker’s rights of others prong.341
333. Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 752; Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1376.
334. Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 752; Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1376.
335. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273.
336. Id. at 273 n.5.
337. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219-20 (involving a tort claim brought by the father of a
deceased Marine against members of a religious congregation who picketed his son’s
funeral).
338. See, e.g., J.S., 650 F.3d at 931 n.5 (concluding even if Tinker’s rights of others
prong applied to student’s fake MySpace profile of her school principal, it could not be
invoked because “no reasonable person” would understand the profile to be describing “actual facts or events”) (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988)).
339. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1166.
340. Id. at 1170-71 (involving a high school student “who was ordered not to wear a Tshirt to school that read, ‘BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS
CONDEMNED’ handwritten on the front, and ‘HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” handwritten on the back’ ”).
341. Id. at 1178.
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The Ninth Circuit focused its decision on speech that strikes at “a core
identifying characteristic” of students based on their membership in a
minority group,342 and limited its holding to “derogatory and injurious
remarks directed at a student’s minority status such as race, religion
and sexual orientation.”343 The Ninth Circuit’s rationale, however,
seems to run headlong into the Supreme Court’s holding in R.A.V., which
held that viewpoint or content discrimination is not permitted even for
categories of unprotected speech.344
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in Harper but
observed that the district court had entered final judgment and dismissed the claims of injunctive relief as moot.345 Therefore, the Court
vacated the judgment in Harper to “clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminate[d] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.”346 No other circuit
has adopted a similar approach to Tinker’s rights of others prong. When
the Seventh Circuit subsequently was presented with a similar First
Amendment claim, it concluded a school that “permits advocacy of the
rights of homosexual students cannot stifle criticism of homosexuality.”347 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Tinker’s second prong
rests on a questionable footing and fails to provide appropriate guidance.
Before outlining the proper scope of Tinker’s rights of other’s prong,
it is worth identifying the types of speech that are not encompassed by
this aspect of Tinker. Student speech on matters of public concern would
not generally fall within the ambit of this aspect of Tinker. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that “speech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . .
is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’ ”348 Indeed, Tinker
involved speech on a matter of public concern and upheld the wearing of
black armbands in silent protest of the war in Vietnam because it had
not resulted in any substantial disorder at school. Since Tinker expressly permitted this type of core political speech, speech on matters of
public concern generally would not be prohibited under Tinker’s rights of
others prong.
It is foreseeable that a student may claim that he was addressing a
matter of public concern, rather than targeting another student for bul342. Id.
343. Id. at 1183. The Ninth Circuit also limited its holding to speech occurring in public
elementary and high schools. Id.
344. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
345. Harper, 549 U.S. at 1262.
346. Id. (quoting Anderson, 513 U.S. at 560 (per curiam)).
347. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 876.
348. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (Powell, J., opinion) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
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lying or harassment through his speech or expressive activities. Take for
example, the situation addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski. The
student could argue that her web page was meant to address the spread
of herpes and other sexually transmitted diseases in high schools, which
is a matter of public concern. In reality, however, the student in Kowalski was targeting a specific student for ridicule and harassment by other
members of her social networking group. When a public-concern argument is raised by a student, school administrators will have to examine
the point of the student’s speech.349 Was it intended to bring a matter of
public concern to light, or was the point to harass and ridicule another
student?350 When the latter conclusion is reached, Tinker’s rights of
others prong can be invoked.
Speech that invades the rights of others does not necessarily have to
result in substantial disruption before this exception can be invoked.
The Court in Tinker discussed the rights of others prong as an alternative basis to impose student discipline. While speech that results in substantial disorder would by definition invade the rights of other
students,351 speech can materially hamper another student’s educational performance without resulting in disorder at school. If substantial
disruption was required before Tinker’s rights of others prong could be
invoked, there would have been no reason for the Court in Tinker to offer
an alternative basis for permitting school districts to discipline student
speech. The Court in Tinker explained, “conduct by a student, in class or
out of it, which . . . involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the . . . guarantee of freedom of
speech.”352
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that both within and
outside the school context, “the mere fact that someone might take offense at the content of speech is not sufficient justification for prohibiting
it;”353 thus, simply because one student finds another student’s clothing
or speech offensive is not a sufficient basis to invoke this prong of Tinker.
By the same token, however, “students cannot hide behind the First
Amendment to protect their right to abuse and intimidate other students
at school.”354 Trying to navigate these landmarks at times can be like
349. See, e.g., Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 2010); Dambrot, 55 F.3d at
1187 (addressing the “point” of a coach’s locker room speech).
350. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (holding information about a particular person’s
credit report “concerns no public issue”).
351. West, 206 F.3d at 1366 (“based on recent past events, . . . School District officials
had reason to believe that a student’s display of the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights of other students to be secure and left alone”).
352. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
353. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
354. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 264.

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-2\SFT201.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 53

TINKERING WITH FIRST AMENDMENT

27-FEB-13

9:35

219

attempting to discern different shades of grey. The Seventh Circuit has
observed that “[s]evere harassment . . . blends insensibly into bullying,
intimidation, and provocation, which can cause serious disruption of the
decorum and peaceable atmosphere of an institution dedicated to the education of youth.”355 While schools have a compelling interest to prevent
harassment and bullying by their students,356 some forms of harassing
speech are protected by the First Amendment.357
Thus, recognizing that limitations on students’ First Amendment
rights have to take into account the special characteristics of the school
environment,358 the appropriate trigger for Tinker’s rights of others
prong is rooted in a student’s ability to safely attend school and effectively learn. Accordingly, when a student’s speech or expressive activity
on the Internet is severe enough that it impairs (or predictably could
impair) another student’s educational performance, the student’s ability
to interact with his or her peers at school, or the student’s safety at
school, the student’s educational rights have been invaded, and Tinker’s
rights of others prong should be invoked.359
Parents send their children to public schools to obtain an education
and expect that their children will be taught in a safe environment conducive to learning. Parents expect that school administrators will address factors that adversely influence their child’s ability to learn at
school. When a student’s Internet activities target another student in a
way that impairs the targeted classmate’s educational performance, or
the student’s ability to interact with his or her classmates, school officials should be allowed to intercede under Tinker in order to maintain an
atmosphere conducive to effective learning. Similarly, when a student’s
Internet speech threatens the safety of another student or group of students at school, their right to learn in a safe environment has been invaded and Tinker’s second prong would permit school officials to address
the threatening speech.
The Third Circuit in J.S. refused to apply Tinker’s rights of others
prong to the fake MySpace profile of the school principal because of a
concern that if it was broadly construed “an assertion of any rights could
transcend and eviscerate the protections of the First Amendment.”360
The Third Circuit’s concern over the evisceration of the First Amendment in J.S is misplaced; the student’s profile which indicated the princi355. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 877 (observing that school authorities are entitled to exercise their discretion when determining if speech has crossed over the line of “hurt
feelings”).
356. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 319-20.
357. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211.
358. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
359. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
360. J.S., 650 F.3d at 931 n.9.
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pal was a sex addict and a pedophile who enjoyed having sex in his office
and hitting on students and their parents went far beyond mere name
calling or rude commentary. A student can harass and bully teachers
and staff as well as other students. There are no age limits with
cyberbullying and no one is immune.361 When the object of the cyberbullying is a member of the school community, the application of the First
Amendment should not vary simply because the student changes the target of his harassment.
In order for schools to properly function, teachers must be able to
effectively teach in a classroom and administrators must be able to efficiently run the operation of the school. To accomplish this work requires
that schools cultivate an atmosphere conducive to ordered learning
which requires that students learn to respect the views of their classmates as well as teachers and school officials. No one would suggest that
the First Amendment permits a student to direct a vituperative or derogatory comment to a teacher while in school.362 Admittedly, when the
same remark is made over the Internet a slightly different dynamic is at
work because work in the classroom is not immediately disrupted by the
comment. But it nonetheless promotes a culture of disrespect at school
that can hamper the learning environment and a teacher’s ability to interact with the student and teach other students.363
Tinker’s rights of others prong can be applied when teachers or staff
are the target of the harassing speech. But, just as the “hurt feelings” a
student might experience following another student’s derogatory comments would not be sufficient to trigger Tinker’s rights of others prong,
neither would hurt feelings or mere derogatory comments be sufficient
when the teacher is the target of the student’s Internet speech. When a
student’s Internet speech is objectively severe enough that it impairs the
learning environment in a classroom, the work of the school, or a teacher
or staff member’s ability to effectively teach or interact with students
and/or parents, then Tinker’s rights of others prong should be invoked.
Proponents of students’ First Amendment rights argue that school
administrators should not become censors of the Internet and that they
361. Bobbie Mixon, Defining a Cyberbully, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (Nov. 8,
2011), http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=121847 (relating the story of
a person who was cyberbullied at the age of 40).
362. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1049 (stating, “our children could not be educated if school
officials supervising pre-college students were without power to punish one who spoke out
in class or who disrupted the quiet of the library or study hall”).
363. Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Mona Shores Pub. Sch., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902
(W.D. Mich. 2005) (stating, “[i]nsubordinate speech . . . is contrary to the principles of civility and respect that are fundamental to a public school education. Failing to take action in
response to such conduct would not only encourage the offending student to repeat the
conduct but also would serve to foster an attitude of disrespect to teachers and staff).
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are usurping the role of parents in disciplining students for their Internet speech. When a student’s Internet speech is not directed at the
school itself or a member of the school community, school officials would
have no reason to intervene unless the Internet speech for some reason
results in disruption at the school or foreseeably could result in substantial disruption. The appropriate line of demarcation between the disciplinary jurisdiction of parents and school administrators is whether the
student’s Internet speech targets the school itself, a school activity, another student, or a member of the school community. When the student’s
Internet speech targets his school, or a member of the school community,
school officials have a legitimate reason to intervene; when the student’s
Internet speech does not target the school or a member of the school community, the regulation and discipline of the student’s Internet speech
would properly lie with the student’s parents unless and until it results
in school disruption.
B. THE ON-CAMPUS/OFF-CAMPUS DISTINCTION
INTERNET SPEECH

IS

UNTENABLE

FOR

Tinker’s reference to students not shedding their constitutional
rights when they enter the school house gate364 has led lower courts, by
negative inference, to conclude that students enjoy the full protection of
the First Amendment once they step away from school property. This
has resulted in the on-campus/off-campus, or point-of-origin distinction
that preoccupies most First Amendment decisions involving student
speech on the Internet. A point-of-origin approach can be relevant to
other mediums of expression, which are not inherently mobile, e.g.,
handwritten material has to be physically delivered to school in order to
be viewed on campus. That approach may also be relevant when it is
argued that the manner in which the speech was delivered caused disruption.365 However, the unique nature of Internet speech renders the
on-campus/off-campus distinction unworkable in today’s digital age.
Students routinely use the Internet and social networking sites to
reach beyond their home. Once information is posted online, it becomes
available to anyone in the world with access to the Internet.366 Internet
speech is inherently mobile. It travels to and with other students, and
can be accessed wherever a student’s laptop computer, tablet, or mobile
364. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07.
365. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Schs., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987,
997 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding a student’s conduct that involved loudly reading a letter
about school personnel in the school cafeteria which referred to the principal as a “skank”
and a “tramp” created disruption sufficient to apply Tinker).
366. Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2011) (observing “the Internet
is omnipresent—when a person places information on the Internet, he can communicate
with persons in virtually every jurisdiction”).
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phone with Internet access is located. Because students bring their mobile phones to school, a student’s Internet speech reaches the school campus whenever a student with a mobile device enters the schoolhouse
gate. Courts that simply focus on where the student was physically located when a message was typed or content was created are ignoring the
inherently mobile nature of Internet speech. The tools of today’s technology have rendered a school’s physical property lines immaterial.
Where the speech itself, as opposed to the manner of its delivery,
loses the protection of the First Amendment due to the potential for disruption it may cause, both the manner of its communication and its point
of origin become immaterial. Even the strongest proponent of student
speech would not suggest the First Amendment allows a student to
falsely yell: “There’s a bomb in the school cafeteria” during a school assembly. The result would not change if the student called the school
with the same false message from home via his mobile phone. And, it
would make no constitutional difference if the student used that same
mobile phone, or a personal computer, to e-mail the message to the
school principal or a group of other students from home. The location
where the speech originates should not change the protection afforded by
the First Amendment because the potential for disruption is the same in
each instance.
The First Amendment also would not permit a student to proclaim
in class that the school principal or another student is a “whore.” Does
the First Amendment permit a student to post the same statement on a
web page or on a social networking site for all classmates, and the rest of
the world for that matter, potentially to see while walking home from
school? In both instances the targeted person’s character and reputation
has been disparaged. When the issue is whether the right of another has
been invaded by a student’s speech, the use of the Internet potentially
would cause greater reputational harm than if the statement is made in
school because the size of the audience on the Internet is far greater.
As one federal court of appeals aptly observed, the on-campus/offcampus distinction “raises the metaphysical question of where [the student] speech occurred when [the student] used the Internet as the medium” of expression.367 Is it where the student was located when the
message was sent or the content created, or is it where the message is
read or the content viewed, or is it both? The Internet eliminates the
spatial distance between the person sending the message or posting the
content and the party viewing it, which has led the concurring judges in
J.S. to recognize that speech is “everywhere at once” on the Internet.368
367. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
368. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
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Attempting to answer the metaphysical question of where Internet
speech occurs is not only futile; it also shifts a court’s focus away from
where it belongs—to analyzing whether the Internet speech substantially disrupted the work or discipline of the school or invaded the rights
of others. Several federal circuits have recently recognized that attempts
to regulate speech that occurs over the Internet cannot turn simply on
where the speaker was located when the message was sent.369 Where
the subject of the student’s Internet speech is the school itself, or another
student, or a member of the school community, that alone should be sufficient to trigger the application of Tinker, Fraser and Morse.
To analogize Internet speech to other forms of student speech is inapt for another reason. The likelihood of a student’s off-campus derogatory comment about a teacher or another student becoming public
knowledge when spoken to a friend is minimal. However, when that
same derogatory remark is posted on a web page, the Internet instantaneously makes that derogatory message available for anyone in the
world to see.370 Voicing the comment on the Internet makes it far more
likely that the comment will find its way back to the teacher or student.
Thus, when the subject of the Internet speech is a teacher, a student or
the school itself, it is simply a matter of time before the derogatory or
harassing speech will find its way to school officials.371 Since students
carry mobile phones with Internet access, it is not simply reasonably
foreseeable that a student’s speech will reach the school—it is inevitable.
Support for discarding the on-campus/off-campus distinction for Internet student speech can also be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s Calder v. Jones decision. Calder addressed an allegedly libelous article that
was written in Florida by a writer who lived in Florida concerning the
“activities of a California resident” whose career was centered in California.372 The issue presented was whether California could exercise juris369. Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220-21 (Jordan, J., concurring); Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
370. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (observing “anyone with access to the Internet can
sign up for a YouTube account and upload any video file . . . so the file may be accessed and
viewed anywhere in the world”).
371. While the five concurring judges in J.S. expressed the view that Tinker does not
apply to off-campus speech, J.S., 650 F.3d at 936, they nonetheless “would have no difficulty applying Tinker to a case where a student sent a disruptive email to school faculty
from his home computer. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940. In their view, “regardless of its point of
origin, speech intentionally directed towards a school is properly considered on-campus
speech.” Id. Therefore, it appears a majority of the Third Circuit would permit regulation of
some student Internet speech. While not officially adopting the Second Circuit’s reasonable
foreseeability test, the view of the five concurring judges is at least consistent with the
Second Circuit’s view. It is reasonably foreseeable that Internet speech, which focuses on
another student or a faculty member would reach the school.
372. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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diction over the writer for the alleged libelous article even though it was
written in Florida. Calder adopted the so-called “effects test,” and held
because the defendant’s conduct was aimed at a person in another state
and caused its harm there, jurisdiction was proper. While the jurisdictional question Calder addressed is analytically distinct, conceptually
the logic of the Court’s rationale generally can be applied here, given the
nature of Internet speech.373
When a student purposefully directs his or her Internet speech at
the school, another student, a teacher or staff member at the school, and
its effects are felt in the school setting because a student’s safety, educational performance, or ability to interact with other students has been
impaired, or a teacher or administrator’s ability to effectively work or
interact with others at school has been hampered, that should be a sufficient nexus to invoke the two prongs of Tinker. Tinker spoke in terms of
speech that interfered with the “work and discipline of the school,” and
Morse recognized the authority of school officials to regulate student
speech extends beyond the walls of the school itself.
1. Have Elementary School Students Been Granted Broader First
Amendment Rights Than Teachers?
If the phony MySpace profile at issue in J.S. had been made by a
teacher rather than a student, would the teacher have been immune
from discipline under the First Amendment? This question is fair because while the First Amendment rights of public employees and public
students are analytically distinct, they “are not mutually exclusive
concepts.”374
The short answer to this question is no, the First Amendment would
not protect a teacher in the hypothetical scenario based on the facts
presented in J.S. The First Amendment allows public employees to
373. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1244 (addressing allegedly tortious Internet postings and noting they may give rise to personal jurisdiction if they are specifically directed at “a forum
state audience or otherwise make the forum state the focal point of the message”); Tamburo
v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 707 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining Calder’s “express aiming requirement” is met when internet messages “purposefully target” a person in his or her forum
state with the goal of inflicting commercial or reputational harm there “even though their
alleged defamatory or tortious statements were circulated more diffusely across the
Internet”).
374. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir. 2011) (observing
“[t]he very basis for understanding a Pickering-based analysis of teacher speech, whether
in-class or out, is the Court’s recognition that teachers do not ‘relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work’ ”). Id.
(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. Of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968)).
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speak as private citizens on matters of public concern.375 However,
when an employee is not speaking as a private citizen,376 or the employee’s speech does not involve a matter of public concern,377 then it is
not protected by the First Amendment.
Creating a phony MySpace profile of your boss is not part of a public
employee’s official duties, so the employee’s “speech” likely would be able
to jump the “private-citizen hurdle” of First Amendment employee
speech claims. However, the defense flounders on the First Amendment’s public-concern hurdle. The Third Circuit in J.S. concluded that
the fake profile was created as a “joke,” and that the profile was “so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously and no one did.”378
Therefore, if the profile was created by a public school employee, it could
not be fairly characterized as speech addressing a matter of public concern. Ridiculing your boss on the Internet is not a form of protected
speech.
Thus, at least on this issue, it appears that eighth grade students in
the Third Circuit enjoy greater First Amendment protection than the
teachers instructing them. This conclusion begs a practical question: if
the role of public schools is to prepare students for meaningful future
employment, what message does the holding in J.S. send students about
how they should conduct themselves as they move into adulthood? Private-sector employers would not countenance the type of Internet speech
involved in J.S., and well-qualified individuals may abandon the educational profession if they cannot be protected from the outrageous Internet speech of students.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Internet student speech is an evolving area of First Amendment law
producing decisions that are highly fact-specific. That trend will likely
continue given the increasing popularity and sophistication of social media on the web. The recognition of Tinker’s rights of others prong will
lessen some of the tension found in decisions applying Tinker to student
speech on the Internet.
375. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
376. Garcetti v. Cellabos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (explaining “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as [private] citizens for First Amendment purposes”). The Garcetti Court explained: “Restricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. at 421-22.
377. San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam) (holding videos of an employee that were made while off duty engaging in sexually explicit activities did not involve
a matter of public concern).
378. J.S., 650 F.3d at 921, 930. The minor plaintiff was in eighth grade when she created the phony MySpace profile of the principal.
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School officials should always address their response to Internet
based student speech with great care because of the complexity of the
First Amendment issues presented. However, a few general principles
can be gleaned from the various court decisions discussed in this article.
First, a school district’s position is strongest when it can demonstrate that a student’s Internet posting communicated what a reasonable
person would view to be a “true threat.” True threats are not protected
speech.379 The more outrageous or potentially dangerous the speech appears from an objective point of view,380 and/or the more potential disruption that can be demonstrated, the more likely it is that the discipline
will be upheld. While courts may not be overly sympathetic to a school
administrator’s reaction to a boorish or disrespectful parody,381 they will
view threats of violence in a far more serious light. Judges are less likely
to second-guess disciplinary decisions when the safety of students is
involved.
Second, while there appears to be a trend towards applying Tinker’s
substantial disruption test to Internet speech, unless and until the oncampus/off-campus distinction has been discarded for Internet speech
claims, a school district should establish, to the extent it can, that a student’s Internet posting or speech was created, transmitted, brought to, or
viewed at school. Historically, courts have applied Tinker to off-campus
activity that was brought to the school by other students.382 Courts that
have enjoined a school district’s disciplinary decisions for off-campus
speech have made a point of mentioning the lack of any nexus between
the student’s speech and the school.383
Off-campus speech can find its way to school in any number of ways.
Students can access another student’s Internet speech and view it online
at school via their cell phones, tablets or laptop computers. Schools
379. See, e.g., Porter, 393 F.3d at 616 (noting “speech is a ‘true threat’ and therefore
unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a ‘serious
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm’ ”).
380. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827-28 (upholding a one-year expulsion of a high school student for writing an article in an underground school newspaper explaining how to hack into
the school’s computers); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 869 (upholding student
expulsion for creating a website with a picture of a teacher with a severed head and soliciting funds for her execution).
381. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (addressing a “Top 10” list about a school’s athletic
director which he created and emailed from his home computer to the home computers of
several friends).
382. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829 (denying plaintiff’s preliminary injunction prohibiting his
punishment for writing articles in an independent newspaper distributed at school); Porter,
393 F.3d at 615 n.22 (collecting cases).
383. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (concluding that defendants did not establish “a
sufficient nexus” between a phony MySpace profile created by a student of his school principal and any disruption of the school environment).
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should be prepared to provide courts with the number of students having
this type of access to the Internet whenever possible. While school districts may purportedly block access to various social networking sites,
they should nonetheless be prepared to demonstrate to a court how students could readily circumvent the school’s Internet filters.384
The potential for disruption does not turn on the type or format of
the student’s speech. For example, Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary
School 181,385 upheld a 50-day suspension of a student for writing a song
that contained lyrics about killing his pregnant teacher’s baby. The student in Wilson burned the song to a CD, and gave two copies of the CD to
other students who brought them to school and played the song for other
students in the school’s computer lab. What matters is the degree of actual disruption that the student’s speech caused, or the foreseeability of
potential disruption, and a district’s ability to prove the level of disruption that occurred or the facts upon which the district based its forecast
of future disruption.
Third, school districts have great leeway in regulating the use of
their computers and the Internet at school. The ability of a district to
establish that a student’s offensive speech was accessed (or created in
whole or in part) through the use of school computers or the school’s computer network, which in turn violated the district’s policies on computer
and Internet use, should help to demonstrate a nexus to the school and
increase the likelihood that a court will uphold the discipline.
Fourth, school districts should not overlook Tinker’s rights of others
prong in defending its disciplinary decisions. Districts should be prepared to present evidence concerning the emotional impact that an Internet posting had on its recipient,386 be it a teacher or a student. School
districts should be prepared to demonstrate how a student’s educational
performance was hampered, or potentially could have been hampered,
how the student’s ability to interact with classmates at school was
harmed, or how a teacher or administrator’s ability to effectively function in the school environment was impaired. Schools should also be
ready to present evidence about the amount of administrative time and
expense that had to be spent in attempting to resolve the problem and
384. Running a “Google search” using the phrase “how to unblock Facebook” for example reveals a number of online tools available to students through which they can access
the social networking site.
385. Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary Sch. Dist. 181, 349 Ill. App. 3d 243 (2d Dist. 2004).
386. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 852 (noting that the teacher who was the
object of a student’s website began taking medication for anxiety and depression, was unable to return to school and was granted a medical leave the following year due to an inability to return to her teaching duties); O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895, at *4 (observing the teacher
who was the object of a YouTube slide show depicting her murder feared for her safety and
became physically ill after watching the slide show).
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the amount of classroom or instructional time lost as a result. Remember, judges are only human, and they invariably may take a harder look
at discipline that seems out of proportion or an overreaction to a student’s speech.
Fifth, students do not enjoy a constitutional right to participate in
extracurricular activities. While it is no guarantee that discipline limited to extracurricular activities will withstand First Amendment scrutiny, to the extent that a school district’s discipline involves a restriction
on participation in extracurricular activities as in Doninger,387 it may
have a better chance of being upheld if challenged. The doctrine “de
minimis non curat lex (the law doesn’t concern itself with trifles)” is applicable to First Amendment claims.388
Additionally, the younger the student, the more discretion will be
afforded a district. Remember, students have to be thirteen or older to
register on MySpace or Facebook under their respective terms of use.389
Finally, a school district’s policies should be clearly spelled out on
these issues. Policies that fail to provide an adequate warning that certain conduct is prohibited or that fail to contain adequately defined standards to prevent their arbitrary enforcement can be challenged on
vagueness or overbreadth grounds under the First Amendment.390 For
example, a student code of conduct that permitted discipline for any behavior judged by school officials “to be inappropriate in a school setting”
was held unconstitutionally vague in Coy v. Board of Education of North
Canton City Schools.391 A school district should always carefully con387. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 214 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing
cases and secondary authorities). The Second Circuit in Doninger subsequently observed,
“the district court correctly determined that it is of no small significance that the discipline
here related to the [the student’s] extracurricular role as a student government leader.”
Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 52. However, the Second Circuit considered the “relevance of this
fact . . . in the context of Tinker,” and explained that the student’s actions risked “frustration of the proper operation of [the school’s] student government and undermined the values that student government, as an extracurricular activity, is designed to promote.” Id.
The Second Circuit also noted in Doninger I, “we have no occasion to consider whether a
different more serious consequence than disqualification for student office would raise constitutional concerns.” Id. at 53. But see Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2011 WL 3501698,
at *10 (concluding a student cannot be punished with a ban from extracurricular activities
for non-disruptive speech”).
388. Brandt, 480 F.3d at 465 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977);
United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2005); Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d
299, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1992); Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1972)).
389. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited June 8, 2012).
390. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
391. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 802. See also Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 704-06 (holding
the school handbook policies were unconstitutionally vague because they prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 458-59 (finding the school
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sider all of its disciplinary options when addressing the appropriate
course for responding to a student’s online activities.
district’s “Retaliatory Policy” unconstitutionally overboard and vague because it contained
no “geographical and contextual” limitations and failed to define critical terms such as
“abuse” and thereby could permit its arbitrary enforcement).
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